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Applied economists (including ourselves) are generally content to study theoretical agents
whose preferences are additive over time and across states of nature. One version goes like
this: Time is discrete, with dates t = 0,1,2,.... At each t > 0, an event zt is drawn
from a ﬁnite set Z, following an initial event z0. The t-period history of events is denoted
by zt = (z0,z1,...,zt) and the set of possible t-histories by Zt. The evolution of events
and histories is conveniently illustrated by an event tree, as in Figure 1, with each branch
representing an event and each node a history or state. Environments like this, involving
time and uncertainty, are the starting point for most of modern macroeconomics and ﬁnance.
A typical agent in such a setting has preferences over payoﬀs c(zt) for each possible history.
A general set of preferences might be represented by a utility function U({c(zt)}). More
common, however, is to impose the additive expected utility structure
U({c(zt)}) =
∞ X
t=0
β
t X
zt∈Zt
p(z
t)u[c(z
t)] = E0
∞ X
t=0
β
tu(ct), (1)
where 0 < β < 1, p(zt) is the probability of history zt, and u is a period/state utility
function. These preferences are remarkably parsimonious: behavior over time and across
states depends solely on the discount factor β, the probabilities p, and the function u.
Although (1) remains the norm throughout economics, there has been extraordinary the-
oretical progress over the last ﬁfty years (and particularly the last twenty ﬁve) in developing
alternatives. Some of these alternatives were developed to account for the anomalous pre-
dictions of expected utility in experimental work. Others arose from advances in the pure
theory of intertemporal choice. Whatever their origin, they oﬀer greater ﬂexibility along
several dimensions, often with only a modest increase in analytical diﬃculty.
What follows is a user’s guide, intended to serve as an introduction and instruction
manual for economists studying problems in which the structure of preferences may play
an important role. Our goal is to describe exotic preferences to mainstream economists:
preferences over time, preferences across states or histories, and (especially) combinations of
the two. We take an overtly practical approach, downplaying or ignoring altogether the many
technical issues that arise in specifying preferences in dynamic stochastic settings, including
their axiomatic foundations. (References are provided in Appendix A for those who are
interested.) We generally assume without comment that preferences can be represented by
increasing, (weakly) concave functions, with enough smoothness and boundary conditions to
generate interior solutions to optimizations. We focus instead on applications, using tractable
functional forms to revisit some classic problems: consumption and saving, portfolio choice,
asset pricing, and Pareto optimal allocations. In most cases, we use utility functions that
are homogeneous of degree one (hence invariant to scale) with constant elasticities (think
power utility). These functions are the workhorses of macroeconomics and ﬁnance, so littleis lost by restricting ourselves in this way.
You might well ask: Why bother? Indeed, we will not be surprised if most economists
continue to use (1) most of the time. Exotic preferences, however, have a number of potential
advantages that we believe will lead to much wider application than we’ve seen to date. One
is more ﬂexible functional forms for approximating features of data — the equity premium,
for example. Another is the ability to ask questions that have no counterpart in the additive
model. How should we make decisions if we don’t know the probability model that generates
the data? Can preferences be dynamically inconsistent? If they are, how do we make
decisions? What is the appropriate welfare criterion? Can we think of some choices as
tempting us away from better ones? Each of these advantages raises further questions: Are
exotic preferences observationally equivalent to additive preferences? If not, how do we
identify their parameters? Are they an excuse for free parameters? Do we even care whether
behavior is derived from preferences?
These questions run through a series of non-additive preference models. In Section 2, we
discuss time preference in a deterministic setting, comparing Koopmans’ time aggregator to
the traditional time-additive structure. In Section 3, we describe alternatives to expected
utility in a static setting, using a certainty-equivalent function to summarize preference
toward risk. We argue that the Chew-Dekel class extends expected utility in useful directions
without sacriﬁcing analytical and empirical convenience. In Section 4, we put time and risk
preference together in a Kreps-Porteus aggregator, which leads to a useful separation between
time and risk preference. Dynamic extensions of Chew-Dekel preferences follow the well-worn
path of Epstein and Zin. In Section 5, we consider risk-sensitive and robust control, whose
application to economics is associated with the work of Hansen and Sargent. Section 6 is
devoted to ambiguity, in which agents face uncertainty over probabilities as well as states.
We describe Gilboa and Schmeidler’s “max-min” utility for static settings and Epstein and
Schneider’s recursive extension to dynamic settings. In Section 7, we turn to “hyperbolic
discounting” and provide an interpretation based on Gul and Pesendorfer’s “temptation”
preferences. The ﬁnal section is devoted to a broader discussion of the role and value of
exotic preferences in economics.
A word on notation and terminology: We typically denote parameters by Greek letters
and functions and variables by Latin letters. We denote derivatives with subscripts; thus V2
refers to the derivative of V with respect to its second argument. In a stationary dynamic
programming problem, J is a value function and a prime (0) distinguishes a future value from
a current value. The abbreviation “iid” means independent and identically distributed and
NID(x,y) means normally and independently distributed with mean x and variance y.
22 Time
Time preference is a natural starting point for macroeconomists, since so much of our subject
is concerned with dynamics. Suppose there is no risk and (for this paragraph only) ct
is one-dimensional. Preferences might then be characterized by a general utility function
U({ct}). A common measure of time preference in this setting is the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption at two consecutive dates (ct and ct+1, say) along a constant
consumption path (ct = c for all t). If the marginal rate of substitution is
MRSt,t+1 =
∂U/∂ct+1
∂U/∂ct
,
then time preference is captured by the discount factor
β(c) ≡ MRSt,t+1(c).
(Picture the slope, −1/β, of an indiﬀerence curve along the “45-degree line.”) If β(c) is less
than one, the agent is said to be impatient: she requires more than one unit of consumption
at t + 1 to induce her to give up one unit at t. For the traditional time-additive utility
function,
U({ct}) =
∞ X
t=0
β
tu(ct), (2)
β(c) = β < 1 regardless of the value of c, so impatience is built in and constant. The rest
of this section is concerned with preferences in which the discount factor can vary with the
level of consumption.
Koopmans’ time aggregator
Koopmans (1960) derives a class of stationary recursive preferences by imposing conditions
on a general utility function U for a multi-dimensional consumption vector c. Our approach
and terminology follow Johnsen and Donaldson (1985). Preferences at all dates come from
the same “date-zero” utility function U. As a result, they are dynamically consistent by
construction: preferences over consumption streams starting at any future date t are consis-
tent with U. Following Koopmans, let tc ≡ (ct,ct+1,...) be an inﬁnite consumption sequence
starting at t. Then we might write utility from date t = 0 on as
U(0c) = U(c0, 1c).
Koopmans’ ﬁrst condition is history-independence: preferences over sequences tc do not de-
pend on consumption at dates prior to t. Without this condition, an agent making sequential
decisions would need to keep track of the history of consumption choices to be able to make
3future choices consistent with U. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption at
two arbitrary dates could depend, in general, on consumption at all dates past, present, and
future. History-independence rules out dependence on the past. With it, the utility function
can be expressed in the form
U(0c) = V [c0,U1(1c)]
for some time aggregator V . As a result, choices over 1c do not depend on c0. (Note,
for example, that marginal rates of substitution between elements of 1c do not depend on
c0.) Koopmans’ second condition is future independence: preferences over ct do not depend
on t+1c. (In Koopmans’ terminology, the ﬁrst and second conditions together imply that
preferences over the present (ct) and future (t+1c) are independent.) This is trivially true if
ct is a scalar, but a restriction on preferences otherwise. The two conditions together imply
that utility can be written
U(0c) = V [u(c0),U1(1c)]
for some functions V and u, which deﬁnes u as a composite commodity for consumption at
a speciﬁc date. Koopmans’ third condition is that preferences are stationary (the same at
all dates). The three conditions together imply that utility can be written in the stationary
recursive form,
U(tc) = V [u(ct),U(t+1c)] (3)
for all dates t. This is a generalization of the traditional utility function (2), where (evi-
dently) V (u,U) = u+βU or the equivalent. As in traditional utility theory, preferences are
unchanged when we apply a monotonic transformation to U: if b U = f(U) for f increasing,
then we replace the aggregator V with b V (u, b U) = f(V [u,f−1( b U)]).
In the Koopmans class of preferences represented by (3), time preference is a property of
the time aggregator V . Consider our measure of time preference for the composite commodity
u. If Ut and ut represent U(tc) and u(ct), respectively, then
Ut = V (ut,Ut+1) = V [ut,V (ut+1,Ut+2)].
The marginal rate of substitution between ut and ut+1 is therefore
MRSt,t+1 =
V2(ut,Ut+1)V1(ut+1,Ut+2)
V1(ut,Ut+1)
.
A constant consumption path with period utility u is deﬁned by U = V (u,U), implying
U = g(u) = V [u,g(u)] for some function g. (Koopmans calls g the correspondence function.)
The discount factor is therefore β(u) = V2[u,g(u)]. You might verify for yourself that V2 is
invariant to increasing transformations of U.
In modern applications, we generally work in reverse order: we specify a period utility
function u and a time aggregator V and use them to characterize the overall utility function
4U. Any U constructed this way deﬁnes preferences that are dynamically consistent, history
independent, future independent, and stationary. In contrast to time-additive preferences
(2), discounting depends on the level of utility u. To get a sense of how this works, consider
the behavior of V2. If preferences are increasing in consumption, u must be increasing in
c and V must be increasing in both arguments. If we consider sequences with constant
consumption, U must be increasing in u, so that
g1(u) = V1[u,g(u)] + V2[u,g(u)]g1(u) =
V1[u,g(u)]
1 − V2[u,g(u)]
> 0.
Since V1 > 0, 0 < V2[u,g(u)] < 1: the discount factor is between zero and one and depends
(in general) on u. Many economists impose an additional condition of increasing marginal
impatience: V2[u,g(u)] is decreasing in u, or
V21[u,g(u)] + V22[u,g(u)]g1(u) = V21[u,g(u)] + V22[u,g(u)]
V1[u,g(u)]
1 − V2[u,g(u)]
< 0.
In applications, this condition is typically used to generate stability of steady states.
Two variants of Koopmans’ structure have been widely used by macroeconomists. One
was proposed by Uzawa (1968), who suggested a continuous-time version of
V (u,U) = u + β(u)U.
(In his model, β(u) = exp[−δ(u)].) Since V21 = 0, increasing marginal impatience is simply
β1(u) < 0 (equivalently, δ1(u) > 0). Another is used by Epstein and Hynes (1983), Lucas
and Stokey (1984), and Shi (1993), who generalize Koopmans by omitting the future inde-
pendence condition. The resulting aggregator is V (c,U), rather than V (u,U), which allows
choice over c to depend on U. If c is a scalar, this is equivalent to (3) (set u(c) = c), but
otherwise need not be. An example is
V (c,U) = u(c) + β(c)U,
where there is no particular relationship between the functions u and β.
Examples
Example 1 (growth and ﬁscal policy). In the traditional growth model, Koopmans preferences
can change both the steady state and the short-run dynamics. Suppose the period utility
function is u(c) and the time aggregator is V (u,U0) = u + β(u)U0, with u increasing and
concave and β1(u) < 0. Gross output y is produced with capital k using an increasing concave
technology f. The resource constraint is y = f(k) = c+k0 +g, where c is consumption, k0 is
5tomorrow’s capital stock, and g is government purchases (constant). The Bellman equation
is
J(k) = max
k0 u[f(k) − k
0 − g] + β(u[f(k) − k
0 − g])J(k
0).
The ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions are
u1(c){1 + β1[u(c)]J(k
0)} = β[u(c)]J1(k
0)
J1(k) = u1(c)f1(k){1 + β1[u(c)]J(k
0)},
which together imply J1(k) = β[u(c)]J1(k0)f1(k). In a steady state, 1 = β(u[f(k) − k −
g])f1(k).
One clear diﬀerence from the traditional model is the role of preferences in determining
the steady state. With constant β, the steady state capital stock solves βf1(k) = 1; u is
irrelevant. With recursive preferences, the steady state solves β(u[f(k) − k − g])f1(k) = 1,
which depends on u through its impact on β. Consider the impact of an increase in g. With
traditional preferences, the steady state capital stock doesn’t change, so any increase in g
is balanced by an equal decrease in c. With recursive preferences and increasing marginal
impatience, an increase in g reduces current utility and therefore raises the discount factor.
The initial drop in c is therefore larger than in the traditional case. In the resulting steady
state, the increase in g leads to an increase in k and a decline in c that is smaller than the
increase in g. The magnitude of the decline depends on β1, the sensitivity of the discount
factor to current utility. [Adapted from Dolmas and Wynne (1998).]
Example 2 (optimal allocations). Time preference aﬀects the optimal allocation of consump-
tion among agents over time. Consider an economy with a constant aggregate endowment y
of a single good, to be divided between two agents with Koopmans preferences, represented
here by the aggregators V (the ﬁrst agent) and W (the second). A Pareto optimal allocation
is summarized by the Bellman equation
J(w) = max
c,w0 V [y − c,J(w
0)]
subject to
W(c,w
0) ≥ w.
Note that both consumption c and promised utility w pertain to the second agent. If λ is
the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions are
V1[y − c,J(w
0)] = λW1(c,w
0)
V2[y − c,J(w
0)]J1(w
0) + λW2(c,w
0) = 0
J1(w) = −λ.
If agents’ preferences are additive with the same discount factor β, then the second and
third equations imply J1(w0)/J1(w) = W2(c,w0)/V2[y − c,J(w0)] = β/β = 1: an optimal
6allocation places the same weight λ = −J1(w) on the second agent’s utility at all dates and
promised utility w is constant. If preferences are additive and β2 > β1 (the second agent is
more patient), then J1(w0)/J1(w) = β2/β1 > 1: an optimal allocation increases the weight
over time on the second, more patient agent and raises her promised utility (w0 > w). In the
more general Koopmans setting, the dynamics depend on the time aggregators V and W.
The allocation converges to a steady state if both aggregators exhibit increasing marginal
impatience and future utility is a normal good. [Adapted from Lucas and Stokey (1984).]
Example 3 (long-run properties of a small open economy). Small open economies with perfect
capital mobility raise diﬃculties with the existence of a steady state that can be resolved by
endogenizing the discount factor. We represent preferences over sequences of consumption c
and leisure 1 − n with a period utility function u(c,1 − n) and a time aggregator V (c,1 −
n,U) = u(c,1 − n) + β(c,1 − n)U. Let output be produced with labor using the linear
technology y = θn, where θ is a productivity parameter. The economy’s resource constraint
is y = c + x, where x is net exports. The agent can borrow and lend in international
capital markets at gross interest rate r, giving rise to the budget constraint a0 = r(a + x) =
r(a + θn − c). The Bellman equation is
J(a) = max
c,n u(c,1 − n) + β(c,1 − n)J[r(a + θn − c)].
The ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions are:
u1 + β1J(a
0) = βJ1(a
0)
u2 + β2J(a
0) = βJ1(a
0)θ
J1(a) = βJ1(a
0)r.
The last equation tells us that in a steady state, β(c,1−n)r = 1. With constant discounting,
there is no steady state, but with more general discounting schemes the form of discounting
determines the steady state and its response to changes in the environment. Here the long-
run impact of a change in (say) θ (the “wage”) depends on the form of β. Suppose β is a
function of n only. Then the steady state condition β(1−n)r = 1 determines n independently
of θ! More generally, the long-run impact on n of a change in θ depends on the form of the
discount function β(c,1 − n). [Adapted from Epstein and Hynes (1983), Mendoza (1991),
Obstfeld (1981), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002), and Shi (1994).]
Example 4 (dynamically inconsistent preferences). Suppose preferences “from date t on” are
given by:
Ut(tc) = u(ct) + δβu(ct+1) + δβ
2u(ct+2) + δβ
3u(ct+3) + ···,
with 0 < δ ≤ 1. When δ = 1 this reduces to the time-additive utility function (2). Otherwise,
we discount utility in periods t + 1,t + 2,t + 3,... by δβ,δβ2,δβ3,.... A little eﬀort should
convince you that these preferences cannot be put into stationary recursive form. In fact,
7they are dynamically inconsistent in the sense that preferences over (say) (ct+1,ct+2) at date t
are diﬀerent from preferences at t+1. (Note, for example, the marginal rates of substitution
between ct+1 and ct+2 at t and t+1.) This structure is ruled out by Koopmans, who begins
with the presumption of a consistent set of preferences. We’ll return to this example in
Section 7. [Adapted from Harris and Laibson (2003) and Phelps and Pollack (1968).]
3 Risk
Our next topic is risk, which we consider initially in a static setting. Our theoretical agent
makes choices that have risky consequences or payoﬀs and has preferences over those con-
sequences and their probabilities. To be speciﬁc, let us say that the state z is drawn with
probability p(z) from the ﬁnite set Z = {1,2,...,Z}. Consequences (c, say) depend on
the state. Having read Debreu’s Theory of Value or the like, we might guess that with
the appropriate technical conditions the agent’s preferences can be represented by a utility
function of state-contingent consequences (“consumption”):
U({c(z)}) = U[c(1),c(2),...,c(Z)].
At this level of generality there is no mention of probabilities, although we can well imagine
that the probabilities of the various states will show up somehow in U, as they do in (1). In
this section, we regard the probabilities as known, which you might think of as an assumption
of “risk” or “rational expectations.” We consider unknown probabilities (“ambiguity”) in
Sections 5 and 6.
We prefer to work with a diﬀerent (but equivalent) representation of preferences. Suppose,
for the time being, that c is a scalar; very little of the theory depends on this, but it
streamlines the presentation. We deﬁne the certainty equivalent of a set of consequences as
a certain consequence µ that gives the same level of utility:
U(µ,µ,...,µ) = U[c(1),c(2),...,c(Z)].
If U is increasing in all its arguments, we can solve this for the certainty-equivalent function
µ({c(z)}). Clearly µ represents the same preferences as U, but we ﬁnd its form particularly
useful. For one thing, it expresses utility in payoﬀ (“consumption”) units. For another,
it summarizes behavior toward risk directly: since the certainty equivalent of a sure thing
is itself, the impact of risk is simply the diﬀerence between the certainty equivalent and
expected consumption.
The traditional approach to preferences in this setting is expected utility, which takes
the form
U({c(z)}) =
X
z
p(s)u[c(z)] = Eu(c),
8or
µ({c(z)}) = u
−1
 
X
z
p(z)u[c(z)]
!
= u
−1 [Eu(c)],
a special case of (1). Preferences of this form are used in virtually all macroeconomic theory,
but decades of experimental research have documented numerous diﬃculties with it. Among
them: people seem more averse to bad outcomes than expected utility implies. See, for
example, the summaries in Kreps (1988, ch 14) and Starmer (2000). We suggest the broader
Chew-Dekel class of risk preferences, which allows us to account for some of the empirical
anomalies of expected utility without giving up its analytical tractability.
The Chew-Dekel risk aggregator
Chew (1983, 1989) and Dekel (1986) derive a class of risk preferences that generalizes ex-
pected utility, yet leads to ﬁrst-order conditions that are linear in probabilities, hence easily
solved and amenable to econometric analysis. In the Chew-Dekel class, the certainty equiv-
alent function µ for a set of payoﬀs and probabilities {c(z),p(z)} is deﬁned implicitly by a
risk aggregator M satisfying
µ =
X
z
p(z)M[c(z),µ]. (4)
(This is Epstein and Zin’s (1989) equation (3.10) with M ≡ F + µ.) Chew (1983, 1989)
and Dekel (1986, Section 2) show that such preferences satisfy a weaker condition than
the notorious independence axiom that underlies expected utility. We assume M has the
following properties: (i) M(m,m) = m (sure things are their own certainty equivalents),
(ii) M is increasing in its ﬁrst argument (ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance), (iii) M is concave
in its ﬁrst argument (risk aversion), and (iv) M(kc,km) = kM(c,m) for k > 0 (linear
homogeneity). Most of the analytical convenience of the Chew-Dekel class follows from the
linearity of equation (4) in probabilities.
In the examples that follow, we focus our attention on the following tractable members
of the Chew-Dekel class:
• Expected utility. A version with constant relative risk aversion is implied by
M(c,m) = c
αm
1−α/α + m(1 − 1/α).
If α ≤ 1, M satisﬁes the conditions outlined above. Applying (4), we ﬁnd
µ =
 
X
z
p(z)c(z)
α
!1/α
,
the usual expected utility with a power utility function.
9• Weighted utility. Chew (1983) suggests a relatively easy way to generalize expected
utility given (4): weight the probabilities by a function of outcomes. A constant-
elasticity version follows from
M(c,m) = (c/m)
γc
αm
1−α/α + m[1 − (c/m)
γ/α].
For M to be increasing and concave in c in a neighborhood of m, the parameters must
satisfy either (a) 0 < γ < 1 and α + γ < 0 or (b) γ < 0 and 0 < α + γ < 1. Note
that (a) implies α < 0, (b) implies α > 0, and both imply α + 2γ < 1. The associated
certainty equivalent function is
µ
α =
P
z p(z)c(z)γ+α
P
x p(x)c(x)γ =
X
z
ˆ p(z)c(z)
α,
where
ˆ p(z) =
p(z)c(z)γ
P
x p(x)c(x)γ.
This version highlights the impact of bad outcomes: they get greater weight than with
expected utility if γ < 0, less weight otherwise.
• Disappointment aversion. Gul (1991) proposes another model that increases sensitivity
to bad events (“disappointments”). Preferences are deﬁned by the risk aggregator
M(c,m) =
(
cαm1−α/α + m(1 − 1/α) c ≥ m
cαm1−α/α + m(1 − 1/α) + δ(cαm1−α − m)/α c < m
with δ ≥ 0. When δ = 0 this reduces to expected utility. Otherwise, disappointment
aversion places additional weight on outcomes worse than the certainty equivalent. The
certainty equivalent function satisﬁes
µ
α =
X
z
p(z)c(z)
α + δ
X
z
p(z)I[c(z) < µ][c(z)
α − µ
α] =
X
z
ˆ p(z)c(z)
α,
where I(x) is an indicator function that equals one if x is true and zero otherwise and
ˆ p(z) =
 
1 + δI[c(z) < µ]
1 + δ
P
x p(x)I[c(x) < µ]
!
p(z).
It diﬀers from weighted utility in scaling up the probabilities of all bad events by the
same factor, and scaling down the probabilities of good events by a complementary
factor, with good and bad deﬁned as better and worse than the certainty equivalent.
All three expressions highlight the recursive nature of the risk aggregator M: we need
to know the certainty equivalent to know which states are bad so that we can compute
the certainty equivalent (and so on).
10Each of these models is described in Epstein and Zin (2001). Other tractable preferences
include semi-weighted utility (Epstein and Zin, 2001), generalized disappointment aversion
(Routledge and Zin, 2003), and rank-dependent preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1990). All
but the last one are members of the Chew-Dekel class.
One source of intuition about these preferences is their state-space indiﬀerence curves,
examples of which are pictured in Figure 2. For the purpose of illustration, suppose there are
two equally likely states (Z = 2, p(1) = p(2) = 1/2). The 45-degree line represents certainty
(c(1) = c(2)). Since preferences are linear homogeneous, the unit indiﬀerence curve (µ = 1)
completely characterizes preferences. For expected utility, the unit indiﬀerence curve is
µ(EU) = [0.5c(1)
α + 0.5c(2)
α]
1/α = 1.
This is the usual convex arc with a slope of minus one (the odds ratio) at the 45-degree line.
As we decrease α, the arc becomes more convex. For weighted utility, the unit indiﬀerence
curve is
µ(WU) =
"
c(1)γ+α + c(2)γ+α
c(1)γ + c(2)γ
#1/α
= 1.
Drawn for the same value of α and a modest negative value of γ, it is more convex than ex-
pected utility, suggesting greater risk aversion. With disappointment aversion, the equation
governing the indiﬀerence curve depends on whether c(1) is larger or smaller than c(2). If
it’s smaller (so that z = 1 is the bad state), the indiﬀerence curve is
µ(DA) =
" 
1 + δ
2 + δ
!
c(1)
α +
￿ 1
2 + δ
￿
c(2)
α
#1/α
= 1.
If it’s larger, we switch the two states around. To express this more compactly, deﬁne sets
of transformed probabilities, ˆ p1 = [(1 + δ)/(2 + δ),1/(2 + δ)] (when z = 1 is the bad state)
and ˆ p2 = [1/(2 + δ),(1 + δ)/(2 + δ)] (when z = 2 is the bad state). Then the indiﬀerence
curve can be expressed
"
min
i
X
z
ˆ pi(z)c(z)
α
#1/α
= 1.
We’ll see something similar in Section 6. For now, note that the indiﬀerence curve is the upper
envelope of two curves based on diﬀerent sets of probabilities. The envelope is denoted by a
solid line, and the extensions of the two curves by dashed lines. The result is an indiﬀerence
curve with a kink at the 45-degree line, where the bad state switches. (As we cross from
below, the bad state switches from 2 to 1.)
Another source of intuition is the sensitivity of certainty equivalents to small risks. For the
two-state case discussed above, consider the certainty equivalent of the outcome c(1) = 1−σ
and c(2) = 1 + σ for small σ > 0, thereby deﬁning the certainty equivalent as a function
11of σ. How much does a small increase in σ reduce µ? For expected utility, a second-order
Taylor series expansion of µ(σ) around σ = 0 is
µ(EU) ≈ 1 − (1 − α)σ
2/2.
This familiar bit of mathematics suggests 1 − α as a measure of risk aversion. For weighted
utility, a similar approximation yields
µ(WU) ≈ 1 − (1 − α − 2γ)σ
2/2,
which suggests 1−α−2γ as a measure of risk aversion. Note that neither expected utility nor
weighted utility has a linear term: agents with these preferences are eﬀectively indiﬀerent to
very small risks. For disappointment aversion, however, the Taylor series expansion is
µ(DA) ≈ 1 −
 
δ
2 + δ
!
σ − (1 − α)
 
4 + 4δ
4 + 4δ + δ2
!
σ
2/2.
The linear term tells us that disappointment aversion exhibits ﬁrst-order risk aversion, a
consequence of the kink in the indiﬀerence curve.
Examples
Example 5 (certainty equivalents for log-normal risks). We illustrate the behavior of Chew-
Dekel preferences in an environment in which the impact of risk on utility is particu-
larly transparent. Deﬁne the risk premium on a risky consumption distribution by rp ≡
log[E(c)/µ(c)], the logarithmic diﬀerence between consumption’s expectation and its cer-
tainty equivalent. Suppose consumption is log-normal: logc(z) = κ1 + κ
1/2
2 z, with z dis-
tributed N(0,1). Recall that if logx ∼ N(a,b), then logE(x) = a+b/2 (“Ito’s lemma,” equa-
tion (42) of Appendix B). Since logc ∼ N(κ1,κ2), expected consumption is exp(κ1 + κ2/2).
Similarly, the certainty equivalent for expected utility is µ = exp(κ1 + ακ2/2) and the risk
premium is rp = (1−α)κ2/2. The proportionality factor (1−α) is the traditional coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion. Weighted utility is not quite kosher in this context (M is concave
only in a neighborhood of µ), but the example nevertheless gives us a sense of its properties.
Using similar methods, we ﬁnd that the certainty equivalent is µ = exp(κ1 + (α + 2γ)κ2/2)
and the risk premium is rp = (1 − α − 2γ)κ2/2. Note that the risk premium is the same
as expected utility with parameter α0 = α + 2γ. This equivalence of expected utility and
weighted utility doesn’t extend to other distributions, but it suggests that we might ﬁnd
some diﬃculty distinguishing between the two in practice. For disappointment aversion, we
ﬁnd the certainty equivalent using mathematics much like that underlying the Black-Scholes
formula:
µ
α = e
ακ1+α2κ2/2 + δ
"
e
ακ1+α2κ2/2Φ
 
logµ − κ1 − ακ2
κ
1/2
2
!
− Φ
 
logµ − κ1
κ
1/2
2
!#
,
12where Φ is the standard normal distribution function; see equation (41) in Appendix B.
Apparently the risk premium is no longer proportional to κ2. We show this in Figure 3,
where we graph rp against κ2 for all three preferences using the same parameter values
as Figure 2 (α = δ = 0.5, γ = −0.25). As you might expect, disappointment aversion
implies proportionately greater aversion to small risks than large ones; in this respect it is
qualitatively diﬀerent from expected utility and weighted utility. Routledge and Zin’s (2003)
generalized disappointment aversion does the reverse: it generates greater aversion to large
risks. Diﬀerent sensitivity to large and small risks provides a possible method to distinguish
such preferences from expected utility.
Example 6 (portfolio choice with Chew-Dekel preferences). One strength of the Chew-Dekel
class is that it leads to ﬁrst-order conditions that are easily solved and used in econometric
work. Consider an agent with initial net assets a0 who invests fractions w in a risky asset
with (gross) return r(z) in state z and 1 − w in a risk-free asset with return r0. For an
arbitrary choice of w, consumption in state z is c(z) = a0[r0 + w(r(z) − r0)]. The portfolio
choice problem might then be written
max
w µ[a0{r0 + w(r(z) − r0)}] = a0 max
w µ[r0 + w(r(z) − r0)],
the second equality stemming from the linear homogeneity of µ. The direct approach to
this problem is to choose w to maximize µ, and in some cases we’ll do that. For the
general Chew-Dekel class, however, we may not have an explicit expression for the certainty
equivalent function. In those cases, we use equation (4):
max
w µ[{r0 + w(r(z) − r0)}] = max
w
X
z
p(z)M[r0 + w(r(z) − r0),µ
∗],
where µ∗ is the maximized value of the certainty equivalent function. The problem on the
right-hand side has ﬁrst-order condition
X
z
p(z)M1[r0 + w(r(z) − r0),µ
∗][r(z) − r0] = E [M1(r0 + w(r − r0),µ
∗)(r − r0)] = 0. (5)
(There are M2 terms, too, but you might verify for yourself that they can be eliminated.)
We ﬁnd the optimal portfolio by solving the ﬁrst-order condition and (4) simultaneously for
w and µ∗. The same conditions can also be used in econometric work to estimate preference
parameters.
To see how you might use (5) to determine w, consider a numerical example with two
equally-likely states and returns r0 = 1.01, r(1) = 0.90, and r(2) = 1.24 (the “equity
premium” is 6%). With expected utility, the ﬁrst-order condition is
(µ
∗)
α−1(1 − β)
X
z
p(z)(r0 + w[r(z) − r0])
α−1 [r(z) − r0] = 0.
µ∗ drops out and we can solve for w independently. For α = 0.5, the solution is w = 4.791,
which implies µ∗ = 1.154. The result is the dual of the equity premium puzzle: with modest
13risk aversion, the observed equity premium induces a huge long position in the risky asset,
ﬁnanced by borrowing. With disappointment aversion, the ﬁrst-order condition is
(1 + δ)p(1)(r0 + w[r(1) − r0])
α−1 [r(1) − r0]
+p(2)(r0 + w[r(2) − r0])
α−1 [r(2) − r0] = 0,
since z = 1 is the bad state. For δ = 0.5, w = 2.147 and µ∗ = 1.037. [Adapted from Epstein
and Zin (1989, 2001).]
Example 7 (portfolio choice with rank-dependent preferences). Rank-dependent preferences
are an interesting alternative to the Chew-Dekel class. We rank states so that the payoﬀs
c(z) are increasing in z and deﬁne the certainty equivalent function by
µ = u
−1
 
X
z
(g[P(z)] − g[P(z − 1)])u[c(z)]
!
= u
−1
 
X
z
ˆ p(z)u[c(z)]
!
,
where g is an increasing function satisfying g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1, P(z) =
Pz
u=1 p(u) is
the cumulative distribution function, and ˆ p(z) = g[P(z)] − g[P(z − 1)] is a transformed
probability. If g(p) = p, this is simply expected utility. If g is concave, these preferences
exhibit risk aversion even if u is linear, However, since µ is nonlinear in probabilities it cannot
be expressed in Chew-Dekel form. At the end of this section, we discuss the diﬃculties this
raises for econometric estimation. In the portfolio choice problem, the ﬁrst-order condition
is X
z
ˆ p(z)u1[c(z)][r(z) − r0] = 0, (6)
which is readily solved if we know the probabilities. [Adapted from Epstein and Zin (1990)
and Yaari (1987).]
Example 8 (risk sharing). Consider a Pareto problem with two agents who divide a given
risky aggregate endowment y(z). If their certainty equivalent functions are identical and ho-
mogeneous of degree one, each agent consumes the same fraction of the aggregate endowment
in all states. The problem is more interesting if the agents have diﬀerent preferences. Let
us say that two agents, indexed by i, have certainty equivalent functions µi[ci(z)]. A Pareto
optimal allocation solves: choose {c1(z),c2(z)} to maximize µ1 subject to c1(z)+c2(z) ≤ y(z)
and µ2 ≥ ¯ µ for some number ¯ µ. If λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the second constraint, the
ﬁrst-order conditions have the form
∂µ1
∂c1(z)
= λ
∂µ2
∂c2(z)
.
With Chew-Dekel risk preferences, the derivatives have the form:
∂µi
∂ci(z)
= p(z)M
i
1[c
i(z),µ
i] +
X
x
p(x)M
i
2[c
i(x),µ
i]
∂µi
∂ci(z)
= p(z)M
i
1[c
i(z),µ
i]/(1 −
X
x
p(x)M
i
2[c
i(x),µ
i]).
14This expression is not particularly user-friendly, but in principle we can solve it numerically
for speciﬁc functional forms. With expected (power) utility, an optimal allocation solves
[µ
1]
1−α1[y(z) − c
2(z)]
α1−1 = λ[µ
2]
1−α2c
2(z)
α2−1,
which implies allocation rules that we can express in the form ci = si(y)y. If we substitute
into the optimality condition and diﬀerentiate, we ﬁnd ds1/dy > 0 if α1 > α2: the less risk
averse agent absorbs a disproportionate share of the risk.
Discussion: moment conditions for preference parameters
One of the most useful features of Chew-Dekel preferences is how easily they can be used
in econometric work. Since the risk aggregator (4) is linear in probabilities, we can apply
method of moments estimators directly to ﬁrst-order conditions.
In a typical method of moments estimator, a vector-valued function f of data x and a
vector of parameters θ of equal dimension satisﬁes the moment condition
Ef(x,θ0) = 0, (7)
where θ = θ0 is the parameter vector that generated the data. A method of moments
estimator θT for a sample of size T replaces the population mean with the sample mean:
T
−1
T X
t=1
f(xt,θT) = 0.
Under reasonably general conditions, a law of large numbers implies that the sample mean
converges to the population mean and θT converges to θ0. When the environment permits
a central limit theorem, we can also derive an asymptotic normal distribution for θT. If the
number of moment conditions (the dimension of f) is greater than the number of parameters
(the dimension of θ), we can apply a generalized method of moments estimator with similar
properties; see Hansen (1982).
The portfolio choice problem with Chew-Dekel preferences has exactly this form if the
number of preference parameters is no greater than the number of risky assets. For each
risky asset i there is a moment condition,
fi(x,θ) = M1(c,µ
∗)(ri − r0),
analogous to equation (5). In the static case, we also need to estimate µ∗, which we do using
(4) as an additional moment condition. (In a dynamic setting, a homothetic time aggregator
allows us to replace µ∗ with a function of consumption growth; see equation (13).)
Outside the Chew-Dekel class, estimation is a more complex activity. First-order con-
ditions are no longer linear in probabilities and do not lead to moment conditions in the
15form of equation (7). To estimate, say, equation (6) for rank-dependent preferences, we need
a diﬀerent estimation strategy. One possibility is a simulated method of moments estima-
tor, which involves something like the following: (i) conjecture a probability distribution
and parameter values; (ii) given these values, solve the portfolio problem for decision rules;
(iii) calculate (perhaps through simulation) moments of the decision rule and compare them
to moments observed in the data; (iv) if the two sets of moments are suﬃciently close, stop;
otherwise, modify parameter values and return to step (i). All of this can be done, but it
highlights the econometric convenience of Chew-Dekel risk preferences.
4 Time and risk
We are now in a position to describe non-additive preferences in a dynamic stochastic en-
vironment like that illustrated by Figure 1. You might guess that the process of specifying
preferences over time and states of nature is simply a combination of the two. In fact, the
combination raises additional issues that are not be readily apparent. We touch on some of
them here; others come up in the next two sections.
Recursive preferences
Consider the structure of preferences in a dynamic stochastic environment. In the tradition
of Kreps and Porteus (1978), Johnsen and Donaldson (1985), and Epstein and Zin (1989),
we represent a class of recursive preferences by
Ut = V [ut,µt(Ut+1)], (8)
where Ut is short-hand for utility starting at some date-t history zt, Ut+1 refers to utilities for
histories zt+1 = (zt,zt+1) stemming from zt, ut is date-t utility, V is a time aggregator, and
µt is a certainty-equivalent function based on the conditional probabilities p(zt+1|zt). This
structure is suggested by Kreps and Porteus (1978) for expected utility certainty equivalent
functions. Epstein and Zin (1989) extend their work to stationary inﬁnite-horizon settings
and propose the more general Chew-Dekel class of risk preferences. As in Section 2, such
preferences are dynamically consistent, history independent, future independent, and sta-
tionary. They are also conditionally independent in the sense of Johnsen and Donaldson
(1985): preferences over choices at any history at date t (¯ zt, for example) do not depend on
other histories that may have (but did not) occur (zt 6= ¯ zt). You can see this in Figure 1:
If we are now at the node marked (A), then preferences do not depend on consumption at
nodes stemming from (B) denoting histories that can no longer occur.
If equation (8) seems obvious, think again. If you hadn’t read the previous paragraph or
16its sources, you might just as easily propose
Ut = µt[V (ut,Ut+1)],
another seemingly natural combination of time and risk preference. This combination, how-
ever, has a serious ﬂaw: it implies dynamically inconsistent preferences unless it reduces to
(1). See Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989, Section 4). File away for
later the idea that the combination of time and risk preference can raise subtle dynamic
consistency issues.
We refer to the combination of the recursive structure (8) and an expected utility certainty
equivalent as Kreps-Porteus preferences. A popular parametric example consists of the
constant elasticity aggregator,
V [u,µ(U)] = [(1 − β)u
ρ + βµ(U)
ρ]
1/ρ , (9)
and the “power certainty equivalent,”
µ(U) = [E(U
α)]
1/α, (10)
with ρ,α < 1. Equations (9) and (10) are homogeneous of degree one with constant discount
factor β. This is more restrictive than the aggregators we considered in Section 2, but linear
homogeneity rules out more general discounting schemes: it implies that indiﬀerence curves
have the same slope along any ray from the origin, so their slope along the 45-degree line must
be the same, too. If U is constant, the weights (1−β) and β deﬁne U = u as the (steady state)
level of utility. It is common to refer to 1 − α as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and
1/(1 − ρ) as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If ρ = α, the model is equivalent
to one satisfying (1) and intertemporal substitution is the inverse of risk aversion. More
generally, the Kreps-Porteus structure allows us to specify risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution independently. Further, a Kreps-Porteus agent prefers early resolution of risk
if α < ρ; see Epstein and Zin (1989, Section 4). This separation of risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution has proved to be not only a useful empirical generalization, but
an important source of intuition about the properties of dynamic models.
We can generate further ﬂexibility by combining (8) with a Chew-Dekel risk aggregator
(4), thereby introducing Chew-Dekel risk preferences to dynamic environments. We refer to
this combination as Epstein-Zin preferences.
Examples
Example 9 (Weil’s model of precautionary saving). We say consumption-saving models gener-
ate precautionary saving if risk decreases consumption as a function of current assets. In the
17canonical consumption problem with additive preferences, income risk has this eﬀect if the
period utility function u has constant k ≡ u111u1/(u11)2 > 0. See, for example, Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2000, pp 390-393). Both power utility and exponential utility satisfy this con-
dition. With power utility (u(c) = cα/α), k = (α − 2)(α − 1), which is positive for α < 1
and therefore implies precautionary saving. (In the next section we look at quadratic utility,
which eﬀectively sets α = 2, implying k = 0 and no precautionary saving.) Similarly, with
exponential utility (u(c) = −exp(−αc)), k = 1 > 0. With Kreps-Porteus preferences we
can address a somewhat diﬀerent question: Does precautionary saving depend on intertem-
poral substitution, risk aversion, or both? To answer this question, consider the problem
characterized by the Bellman equation
J(a) = max
c {(1 − β)c
ρ + βµ[J(a
0)]
ρ}
1/ρ
subject to the budget constraint a0 = r(a − c) + y0, where µ(x) = −α−1 logE exp(−αx) and
{yt} ∼ NID(κ1,κ2). The exponential certainty equivalent µ is not homogeneous of degree
one, but it is analytically convenient for problems with additive risk. The parameters satisfy
ρ ≤ 1, α ≥ 0, r > 1, and β1/(1−ρ)rρ/(1−ρ) < 1. Of particular interest are ρ, which governs
intertemporal substitution, and α, which governs risk aversion.
The value function in this example is linear with parameters that can be determined
by the time-honored guess-and-verify method. We guess (we’ve seen this problem before)
J(a) = A + Ba for parameters (A,B) to be determined. The certainty equivalent of future
utility is
µ[J(a
0)] = µ[A + Br(a − c) + By
0] = A + Br(a − c) + Bκ1 − αB
2κ2/2, (11)
which follows from equation (42) of Appendix B. The ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions
are
0 = J(a)
1−ρ
h
(1 − β)c
ρ−1 − βµ
ρ−1Br
i
J1(a) = B = J(a)
1−ρβµ
ρ−1Br,
which imply
µ = (βr)
1/(1−ρ)J(a) = (βr)
1/(1−ρ)(A + Ba)
c = [(1 − β)/B]
1/(1−ρ)J(a) = [(1 − β)/B]
1/(1−ρ)(A + Ba).
The latter tells us that the decision rule is linear, too. If we substitute both equations into
(11), we ﬁnd that the parameters of the value function must be
A = (r − 1)
−1(κ1 − Bακ2/2)B, B =
"
(1 − β)1/(1−ρ)
1 − β1/(1−ρ)rρ/(1−ρ)
#(1−ρ)/ρ
.
18They imply the decision rule
c =
￿
1 − β
1/(1−ρ)r
ρ/(1−ρ)
￿ ￿
a + (r − 1)
−1[κ1 − Bακ2/2]
￿
.
The last term is the impact of risk. Apparently a necessary condition for precautionary
saving is α > 0, so the parameter controlling precautionary saving is risk aversion. [Adapted
from Weil (1993).]
Example 10 (Merton-Samuelson portfolio model). Our next example illustrates the relation
between consumption and portfolio decisions in iid environments. The model is similar to
the previous example, and we use it to address a similar issue: the impact of asset return
risk on consumption. At each date t a theoretical agent faces the budget constraint
at+1 = (at − ct)
X
i
witrit+1,
where wit is the share of post-consumption wealth invested in asset i and rit+1 is its return.
Returns {rit+1} are iid over time. Preferences are characterized by the constant elasticity
time aggregator (9) and an arbitrary linearly homogeneous certainty equivalent function.
The Bellman equation is
J(a) = max
c,w {(1 − β)c
ρ + βµ[J(a
0)]
ρ}
1/ρ,
subject to
a
0 = (a − c)
X
i
wir
0
i = (a − c)r
0
p
and
P
i wi = 1, where rp is the portfolio return. Since the time and risk aggregators are linear
homogeneous, so is the value function, and the problem decomposes into separate portfolio
and consumption problems. The portfolio problem is:
max
w µ[J(a
0)] = (a − c) max
w µ[J(r
0
p)].
Since returns are iid, the portfolio problem is the same at all dates and can be solved using
methods outlined in the previous section. Given a solution µ∗ to the portfolio problem, the
consumption problem is:
J(a) = max
c {(1 − β)c
ρ + β[(a − c)µ
∗)]
ρ}
1/ρ.
The ﬁrst-order condition implies the decision rule c = [A/(1 + A)]a, where
A = [(1 − β)/β]
1/(1−ρ)(µ
∗)
−ρ/(1−ρ).
The impact of risk is mediated by µ∗ and involves the familiar balance of income and sub-
stitution eﬀects. If ρ < 0, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one and
smaller µ∗ (larger risk premium) is associated with lower consumption (the income eﬀect).
19If ρ > 0, the opposite happens. In contrast to the previous example, the governing pa-
rameter is ρ; the impact of risk parameters is imbedded in µ∗. Note, too, that the impact
on consumption of a change in µ∗ can generally be oﬀset by a change in β that leaves A
unchanged. This leads to an identiﬁcation issue that we discuss at greater length in the next
example. Farmer and Gertler use a similar result to motivate setting α = 1 (risk neutrality)
in the Kreps-Porteus preference models, which leads to linear decision rules even with risk
to income, asset returns, and length of life. [Adapted from Epstein and Zin (1989), Farmer
(1990), Gertler (1999), and Weil (1990).]
Example 11 (asset pricing). The central example of this section is an exploration of time and
risk preference in the traditional exchange economy of asset pricing. Preferences are governed
by the constant elasticity time aggregator (9) and the Chew-Dekel risk aggregator (4). We
characterize asset returns for general recursive preferences and discuss the identiﬁcation of
time and risk preference parameters. We break the argument into a series of steps.
Step (i) (consumption and portfolio choice). Consider a stationary Markov environment
with states z and conditional probabilities p(z0|z). A dynamic consumption/portfolio prob-
lem for this environment is characterized by the Bellman equation
J(a,z) = max
c,w {(1 − β)c
ρ + βµ[J(a
0,z
0)]
ρ}
1/ρ,
subject to the budget constraint a0 = (a − c)
P
i wiri(z,z0) = (a − c)
P
i wir0
i = (a − c)r0
p,
where rp is the portfolio return. The budget constraint and linear homogeneity of the time
and risk aggregators imply linear homogeneity of the value function: J(a,z) = aL(z) for
some scaled value function L. The scaled Bellman equation is
L(z) = max
b,w
{(1 − β)b
ρ + β(1 − b)
ρµ[L(z
0)rp(z,z
0)]
ρ}
1/ρ,
where b ≡ c/a. Note that L(z) is the marginal utility of wealth in state z.
As in the previous example, the problem divides into separate portfolio and consumption
decisions. The portfolio decision solves: choose {wi} to maximize µ[L(z0)rp(z,z0)]. The
mechanics are similar to Example 6. The portfolio ﬁrst-order conditions are
X
z0
p(z
0|z)M1[L(z
0)rp(z,z
0),µ]L(z
0)[ri(z,z
0) − rj(z,z
0)] = 0 (12)
for any two assets i and j. Given a maximized µ, the consumption decision solves: choose b
to maximize L. The intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition is
(1 − β)b
ρ−1 = β(1 − b)
ρ−1µ
ρ. (13)
If we solve for µ and substitute into the (scaled) Bellman equation, we ﬁnd
µ = [(1 − β)/β]
1/ρ[b/(1 − b)]
(ρ−1)/ρ
L = (1 − β)
1/ρb
(ρ−1)/ρ. (14)
20The ﬁrst-order condition (13) and value function (14) allow us to express the relation between
consumption and returns in almost familiar form. Since µ is linear homogeneous, the ﬁrst-
order condition implies µ(x0r0
p) = 1 for
x
0 = L
0/µ =
h
β(c
0/c)
ρ−1(r
0
p)
1−ρ
i1/ρ
.
The last equality follows from (c0/c) = (b0/b)(1−b)r0
p, a consequence of the budget constraint
and the deﬁnition of b. The intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition can therefore be expressed
µ(x
0r
0
p) = µ
￿h
β(c
0/c)
ρ−1r
0
p
i1/ρ￿
= 1, (15)
a generalization of the tangency condition for an optimum (set the marginal rate of sub-
stitution equal to the price ratio). Similar logic leads us to express the portfolio ﬁrst-order
conditions (12) as
E
h
M1(x
0r
0
p,1)x
0(r
0
i − r
0
j)
i
= 0.
If we multiply by the portfolio weight wj and sum over j we ﬁnd
E
h
M1(x
0r
0
p,1)x
0r
0
i
i
= E
h
M1(x
0r
0
p,1)x
0r
0
p
i
. (16)
Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions allows us to express the right side as
E
h
M1(x
0r
0
p,1)x
0r
0
p
i
= 1 − EM2(x
0r
0
p,1).
Whether this is helpful depends on M. [Adapted from Epstein and Zin (1989).]
Step (ii) (equilibrium). Now shift focus to an exchange economy in which output growth
follows a stationary Markov process: g0 = y0/y = g(z0). In equilibrium, consumption equals
output and the optimal portfolio is a claim to the stream of future output. We denote the
price of this claim by q and the price-output ratio by Q = q/y. Its return is therefore
r
0
p = (q
0 + y
0)/q = (Q
0y
0 + y
0)/(Qy) = g
0(Q
0 + 1)/Q. (17)
With linear homogeneous preferences, the equilibrium price-output ratio is a stationary
function of the current state, Q(z). Asset pricing then consists of these steps: (a) Substitute
(17) into (15) and solve for Q:
µ
￿
[β(g
0)
ρ(Q
0 + 1)]
1/ρ￿
= Q
1/ρ.
(b) Compute the portfolio return rp from (17). (c) Use (16) to derive returns on other assets.
Step (iii) (the iid case). If the economy is iid, we cannot generally identify separate time
and risk parameters. Time and risk parameters are intertwined in (16), but suppose we were
somehow able to estimate the risk parameters. How might we estimate the time preference
21parameters β and ρ from observations of rp (returns) and b (the consumption-wealth ratio)?
Formally, equations (13) and (14) imply the intertemporal optimality condition
(1 − b)
1−ρ = βµ(r
0
p)
ρ.
If rp is iid, µ and b are constant. With no variation in µ or b, the optimality condition
cannot tell us both ρ and β: for any value of ρ, we can satisfy the condition by adjusting
the discount factor β. The only limit to this is the restriction β < 1. Evidently a necessary
condition for identifying separate time and risk parameters is that risk varies over time. The
issue doesn’t arise with additive preferences, which tie time preference to risk preference.
[Adapted from Kocherlakota (1990) and Wang (1993).]
Step (iv) (extensions). With Kreps-Porteus preferences and non-iid returns, the model
does somewhat better in accounting for asset returns. It nevertheless fails to provide an
entirely persuasive account of observed relations between asset returns and aggregate con-
sumption. Roughly speaking, the same holds for more general risk preference speciﬁcations,
although the combination of exotic preferences and time-varying risk shows promise. [See
Bansal and Yaron (2003), Epstein and Zin (1991), Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2003),
Routledge and Zin (2003), Tallarini (2000), and Weil (1989).]
Example 12 (risk sharing). With additive preferences and equal discount factors, Pareto
problems generate constant weights on agents’ utilities over time and across states of nature,
even if period/state utility functions diﬀer. With Kreps-Porteus preferences, diﬀerences in
risk aversion lead to systematic drift in the weights. To be concrete, suppose states z follow
a Markov chain with conditional probabilities p(z0|z). Aggregate output is y(z). Agents have
the same aggregator, V (c,µ) = (cρ + βµρ)/ρ, but diﬀerent certainty equivalent functions,
µ
i[x(z
0)] =
 
X
z0
p(z
0|z)x(z
0)
αi
!1/αi
for state-dependent “utility” x. The Bellman equation for the Pareto problem is
J(w,z) = max
c,{wz0}
￿
(y(z) − c)
ρ + βµ
1[J(wz0,z
0)]
ρ
￿
/ρ
subject to ￿
c
ρ + βµ
2[wz0]
ρ
￿
/ρ ≥ w.
Here c and wz0 refer to consumption and promised future utility of the second agent. The
ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions imply
(y(z) − c)
ρ−1 = λc
ρ−1
(µ
1)
ρ−α1J(wz0,z
0)
α1−1J1(wz0,z
0) = J1(w,z)(µ
2
z0)
ρ−α2w
α2−1
z0
J1(w,z) = −λ.
22The ﬁrst equation leads to the familiar allocation rule c = [1 + λ1/(ρ−1)]−1y(z). If α1 6= α2,
the weight λ will generally vary over time. [Adapted from Anderson (2004) and Kan (1995).]
Example 13 (habits, disappointment aversion, and conditional independence). Habits and
disappointment aversion both assess utility by comparing consumption to a benchmark.
With disappointment aversion, the benchmark is the certainty equivalent. With habits,
the benchmark is a function of past consumption. Despite this apparent similarity, there
are a number of diﬀerences between them. One is timing: the habit is known and ﬁxed
when current decisions are made, while the certainty equivalent generally depends on those
decisions. Another is that disappointment aversion places restrictions on the benchmark
that have no obvious analog in the habit model. A third is that habits take us outside the
narrowly-deﬁned class of recursive preferences summarized by equation (8): they violate the
assumption of conditional independence. Why? Because preferences at any node in the
event tree depend on past consumption through the habit, which in turn depends on nodes
that can no longer be reached. In Figure 1, for example, decisions at node (A) depend on
the habit, which was chosen at (say) the initial node z0 and therefore depends on anything
that could have happened from there on, including (B) and its successors. The solution,
of course, is to deﬁne preferences conditional on a habit state variable and proceed in the
natural way.
Discussion: distinguishing time and risk preference
The deﬁning feature of this class of preferences is the separation of time preference (sum-
marized by the aggregator V ) and risk preference (summarized by the certainty equivalent
function µ). In the functional forms used in this section, time preference is characterized
by a discount factor and an intertemporal substitution parameter. Risk preference is char-
acterized by risk aversion and possibly other parameters indicated by the Chew-Dekel risk
aggregator. We have therefore added one or more parameters to the conventional additive
utility function (1). Examples suggest that the additional parameters may be helpful in
explaining precautionary saving, asset returns, and the intertemporal allocation of risk.
A critical question in applications is whether these additional parameters can be identiﬁed
and estimated from a single time series realization of all the relevant variables. If so, we can
use the methods outlined in the previous section: apply a method of moments estimator to
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem of interest. Identiﬁcation hinges on the nature of
risk. If risk is iid, we cannot identify separate time and risk parameters. This is clear in
examples, but the logic is both straightforward and general: we need variation over time to
identify time preference. A more formal statement is given by Wang (1993).
235 Risk-sensitive and robust control
Risk-sensitive and robust control emerged in the engineering literature in the 1970s and were
brought to economics and developed further by Hansen and Sargent, their many coauthors,
and a few other brave souls. The most popular version of risk-sensitive control is based on
Kreps-Porteus preferences with an exponential certainty equivalent function. Robust control
considers a new issue: decision making when the agent does not know the probability model
generating the data. The agent considers instead a range of models, and makes decisions
that maximize utility given the worst possible model. The same issue is addressed from
a diﬀerent perspective in the next section. Much of this work deals with linear-quadratic-
guassian (LQG) problems, but the ideas are applicable more generally. We start by describing
risk-sensitive and robust control in a static scalar LQG setting, where the insights are less
cluttered by algebra. We go on to consider dynamic LQG problems, robust control problems
outside the LQG universe, and challenges of estimating, and distinguishing between, models
based on risk-sensitive and robust control.
Static control
Many of the ideas behind risk-sensitive and robust control can be illustrated with a static,
scalar example. We consider traditional optimal control, risk-sensitive control, and robust
control as variants of the same underlying problem. The striking result is the equivalence of
optimal decisions made under risk-sensitive and robust control.
In our example, an agent maximizes some variant of a quadratic “return” function,
u(v,x) = −[Qv
2 + Rx
2],
subject to the linear constraint,
x = Ax0 + Bv + C(w + ε), (18)
where v is a control variable chosen by the agent, x is a state variable that is controlled
indirectly through v, x0 is a ﬁxed “initial” value, (Q,R) > 0 are preference parameters,
(A,B,C) are nonzero parameters describing the determination of x, ε ∼ N(0,1) is noise,
and w is a distortion of the model that we’ll describe in greater detail when we get to robust
control. The problem sets up a tradeoﬀ between the cost (Qv2) and potential beneﬁt (Rx2)
of nonzero values of v. If you’ve seen LQG control problems before, most of this should look
familiar.
Optimal control. In this problem and the next one we set w = 0, thereby ruling out
distortions. The control problem is: choose v to maximize Eu given the constraint (18).
Since
Eu = −[Qv
2 + R(Ax0 + Bv)
2] − RC
2, (19)
24the objective functions with and without noise diﬀer only by a constant. Noise therefore has
no impact on the optimal choice of v. For both problems, the optimal v is
v = −(Q + B
2R)
−1(ABR)x0.
This solution serves as a basis of comparison for the next two.
Risk-sensitive control. Continuing with w = 0, we consider an alternative approach that
brings risk into the problem in a meaningful way: we maximize an exponential certainty
equivalent of u:
µ(u) = −α
−1 logE exp(−αu),
where α ≥ 0 is a risk aversion parameter. (This is more natural in a dynamic setting, where
we would compute the certainty equivalent of future utility ` a la Kreps and Porteus.) We
ﬁnd µ(u) by applying formula (43) of Appendix B:
µ(u) = −(1/2)log(1 − 2αRC
2) − [Qv
2 + [R/(1 − 2αRC
2)](Ax0 + Bv)
2] (20)
as long as 1 − 2αRC2 > 0. This condition places an upper bound on the risk aversion
parameter α. Without it, the agent can be so sensitive to risk that her objective function
is negative inﬁnity regardless of the control. The ﬁrst term on the right side of (20) does
not depend on v or x, so it has no eﬀect on the choice of v. The important diﬀerence from
(19) is the last term: the coeﬃcient of (Ax0 +Bv)2 is larger than R, making the agent more
willing to tolerate nonzero values of v to bring x close to zero. The optimal v is
v = −(Q + B
2R − αQRC
2)
−1(ABR)x0.
If α = 0 (risk neutrality) or C = 0 (no noise), this is the same as the optimal control solution.
If α > 0 and C 6= 0, the optimal choice of v is larger in absolute value because risk aversion
increases the beneﬁt of driving x to zero.
Robust control. Our third approach is conceptually diﬀerent. We bring back the distortion
w and tell the following story: We are playing a game against a malevolent nature, who
chooses w to minimize our objective function. If our objective were to maximize Eu, then w
would be inﬁnite and our objective function would be minus inﬁnity regardless of what we
do. Let us therefore add a penalty (to nature) of θw2, making our objective function
min
w Eu + θw
2.
The parameter θ > 0 has the eﬀect of limiting how much nature distorts the model, with
small values of θ implying weaker limits on nature. The minimization implies
w = (θ − RC
2)
−1R(Ax0 + Bv),
25making the robust control objective function
min
w Eu + θw
2 = −[Qv
2 + [R/(1 − θ
−1RC
2)](Ax0 + Bv)
2] − RC
2. (21)
The remarkable result: if we set θ−1 = 2α, the robust control objective diﬀers from the
risk-sensitive control objective (20) only by a constant, so it leads to the same choice of v.
As in risk-sensitive control, the choice of v is larger in absolute value, in this case to oﬀset
the impact of w. There is, once again, a limit on the parameter: where α was bounded
above, θ is bounded below. An inﬁnite value of θ reproduces the optimal control objective
function and solution.
A further result applies to the example: risk-sensitive and robust control are observa-
tionally equivalent to the traditional control problem with suitably adjusted R. That is, if
we replace R in equation (19) with
b R = R/(1 − 2αRC
2) = R + 2αR
2C
2/(1 − 2αRC
2) > R, (22)
then the optimal control problem is equivalent to risk-sensitive control, which we’ve seen is
equivalent to robust control. If Q and R are functions of more basic parameters it may not
be possible to adjust R in this way, but the exercise points to the qualitative impact on the
control: be more aggressive. This result need not survive beyond the scalar case, but it’s
suggestive.
Although risk-sensitive and robust control lead to the same decision, they are based
on diﬀerent preferences and give the decision diﬀerent interpretations. With risk-sensitive
control, we are concerned with risk for traditional reasons and the parameter α measures risk
aversion. With robust control, we are concerned with model uncertainty (possible nonzero
values of w). To deal with it, we make decisions that maximize given the worst possible
speciﬁcation error. The parameter θ controls how bad the error can be.
Entropy constraints. One of the most interesting developments in robust control is a
procedure for setting θ: namely, choose θ to limit the magnitude of model speciﬁcation
error, with speciﬁcation error measured by entropy. We deﬁne the entropy of transformed
probabilities ˆ p relative to reference probabilities p by
I(ˆ p;p) ≡
X
z
ˆ p(z)log[ˆ p(z)/p(z)] = b E log(ˆ p/p), (23)
where the expectation is understood to be based on ˆ p. Note that I(ˆ p;p) is non-negative and
equals zero when ˆ p = p. Since the likelihood is the probability density function expressed as
a function of parameters, entropy can be viewed as the expected diﬀerence in log-likelihoods
between the reference and transformed models, with the expectation based on the latter.
In a robust control problem, we can limit the amount of speciﬁcation error faced by
an agent by imposing an upper bound on I: consider (say) only transformations ˆ p such
26that I(ˆ p;p) ≤ I0 for some positive number I0. This entropy constraint takes a particularly
convenient form in the normal case. Let ˆ p be the density of x implied by equation (18) and
p the density with w = 0:
ˆ p(x) = (2πC
2)
−1/2 exp[−(x − Ax0 − Bv − Cw)
2/2C
2] = (2πC
2)
−1/2 exp[−ε
2/2]
p(x) = (2πC
2)
−1/2 exp[−(x − Ax0 − Bv)
2/2C
2] = (2πC
2)
−1/2 exp[−(w + ε)
2/2].
Relative entropy is
I(ˆ p;p) = b E(w
2/2 + wε) = w
2/2.
If we add the constraint w2/2 ≤ I0 to the optimal control objective (19), the new objective
is
min
w −[Qv
2 + R(Ax0 + Bv + Cw)
2] − RC
2 + θ(w
2 − 2I0),
where θ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. The only diﬀerence from the robust
control problem we discussed earlier is that θ is determined by I0. Low values of I0 (tighter
constraints) are associated with high values of θ, so the lower bound on θ is associated with
an upper bound on I0.
Example 14 (Kydland and Prescott’s inﬂation game). A popular macroeconomic policy game
goes like this: the government chooses inﬂation q to maximize the quadratic return function,
u(q,y) = −[q
2 + Ry
2],
subject to the Phillips curve,
y = y0 + B(q − q
e) + C(w + ε),
where y is the deviation of output from its social optimum, qe is expected inﬂation, (R,B,C)
are positive parameters, y0 is the noninﬂationary level of output, and ε ∼ N(0,1). We assume
y0 < 0, which imparts an inﬂationary bias to the economy.
This problem is similar to our example, with one twist: We assume qe is chosen by private
agents to equal the value of q they expect the government to choose (another deﬁnition of
rational expectations), but taken as given by the government (and nature). Agents know
the model, so they end up setting qe = q. A robust control version of this problem leads to
the optimization:
max
q min
w −E
￿
q
2 + R[y0 + B(p − p
e) + C(w + ε)]
2
￿
+ θw
2.
Note that we can do the min and max in any order (the min-max theorem). We do both at
the same time, which generates the ﬁrst-order conditions
q + RB[y0 + B(q − q
e) + Cw] = 0
−θw + RC[y0 + B(q − q
e) + Cw] = 0.
27Applying the rational expectations condition qe = q leads to
q = −
￿ RB
1 − θ−1RC2
￿
y0, w =
 
θ−1RC
1 − θ−1RC2
!
y0.
Take θ−1 = 0 as the benchmark. Then q = −RBy0 > 0 (the inﬂationary bias we mentioned
earlier) and w = 0 (no distortions). For smaller values of θ > RC2, inﬂation is higher.
Why? Because negative values of w eﬀectively lower the noninﬂationary level of output (it
becomes y0 + Cw), leading the government to tolerate more inﬂation. As θ approaches its
lower bound of RC2, inﬂation approaches inﬁnity. If we treat this as a “constraint problem”
with entropy bound w2/2 ≤ I0, then w = −(2I0)1/2 (recall that w < 0) and the Lagrange
multiplier θ is related to I0 by
θ = RC
2 − RCy0/(2I0)
1/2.
The lower bound on θ corresponds to an upper bound on I0. All of this is predicated on
private agents understanding the government’s decision problem, including the value of θ.
[Adapted from Hansen and Sargent (2004, ch 5) and Kydland and Prescott (1977).]
Example 15 (entropy with three states). With three states, the constraint I(ˆ p;p) ≤ I0 is two-
dimensional, since the probability of the third state can be computed from the other two.
Figure 4 illustrates the constraint for the reference probabilities p(1) = p(2) = p(3) = 1/3
(the point marked “+”) and I0 = 0.1. The boundary of the constraint set is the “egg.”
By varying I0 we vary the size of the constraint set. Chew-Dekel preferences can be viewed
from the same perspective. Disappointment aversion, for example, is a one-dimensional class
of “distortions.” If the ﬁrst state is the only one worse than the certainty equivalent, the
transformed probabilities are ˆ p(1) = (1 + δ)p(1)/[1 + δp(1)], ˆ p(2) = p(2)/[1 + δp(1)], and
ˆ p(3) = p(3)/[1 + δp(1)]. Their entropy is
I(δ) = log[1 + δp(1)] − p(1)log(1 + δ),
a positive increasing function of δ ≥ 0. By varying δ subject to the constraint I(δ) ≤ I0, we
produce the line shown in the ﬁgure. (It hits the boundary at δ = 1.5.) The interpretation of
disappointment aversion, however, is diﬀerent: in the theory of Section 3, the line represents
diﬀerent preferences, not model uncertainty.
Dynamic control
Similar issues and equations arise in dynamic settings. The traditional linear-quadratic
control problem starts with the quadratic return function,
u(vt,xt) = −
￿
v
>
t Qvt + x
>
t Rxt + 2x
>
t Svt
￿
,
28where v is the control and x is the state. Both are vectors, and (Q,R,S) are matrices of
suitable dimension. The state evolves according to the law of motion
xt+1 = Axt + Bvt + C(wt + εt+1), (24)
where w is a distortion (zero in some applications) and {εt} ∼ NID(0,I) is random noise. We
use these inputs to describe optimal, risk-sensitive, and robust control problems. As in the
static example, the central result is the equivalence of decisions made under risk-sensitive
and robust control. We skip quickly over the more torturous algebraic steps, which are
available in the sources listed in Appendix A.
Optimal control. We maximize the objective function,
E0
∞ X
t=0
β
tu(vt,xt),
subject to (24) and wt = 0. From long experience, we know that the value function takes
the form
J(x) = −x
>Px − q (25)
for a positive semi-deﬁnite symmetric matrix P and a scalar q. The Bellman equation is
−x
>Px − q = max
v
n
−
￿
v
>Qv + x
>Rx + 2x
>Sv
￿
−βE
h
(Ax + Bv + Cε
0)
>P(Ax + Bv + Cε
0) + p
io
. (26)
Solving the maximization in (26) leads to the Riccati equation
P = R + βA
>PA − (βA
>PB + S)(Q + βB
>PB)
−1(βB
>PA + S
>). (27)
Given a solution for P, the optimal control is v = −Fx, where
F = (Q + βB
>PB)
−1(βB
>PA + S
>). (28)
As in the static scalar case, risk is irrelevant: the control (28) does not depend on C. You
can solve such problems numerically by iterating on the Riccati equation: make an initial
guess of P (we use I), plug it into the right side of (27) to generate the next estimate of
P, and repeat until successive values are suﬃciently close together. See Anderson, Hansen,
McGrattan, and Sargent (1996) for algebraic details, conditions guaranteeing convergence,
and superior computational methods (the doubling algorithm, for example).
Risk-sensitive control. Risk-sensitive control arose independently, but can be regarded as
an application of Kreps-Porteus preferences using an exponential certainty equivalent. The
exponential certainty equivalent introduces risk into the decisions without destroying the
quadratic structure of the value function. The Bellman equation is
J(x) = max
v {u(v,x) + βµ[J(x
0)]},
29where the maximization is subject to x0 = Ax+Bv+Cε0 and µ(J) = −α−1 logE exp(−αJ).
If the value function has the quadratic form (25), the multivariate analog to (43) gives us:
µ[J(Ax + Bv + Cε
0)] = −(1/2)log|I − 2αC
>PC| + (Ax + Bv)
> b P(Ax + Bv),
where
b P = P + 2αPC(I − 2αC
>PC)
−1C
>P (29)
as long as |I − 2αC>PC| > 0. Each of these pieces has a counterpart in the static case.
The inequality again places an upper bound on the risk aversion parameter α; for larger
values, the integral implied by the expectation diverges. Equation (29) corresponds to (22);
in both equations, risk sensitivity increases the agent’s aversion to non-zero values of the
state variable. Substituting b P into the Bellman equation and maximizing leads to a variant
of the Riccati equation,
P = R + βA
> b PA − (βA
> b PB + S)(Q + βB
> b PB)
−1(βB
> b PA + S
>), (30)
and associated control matrix,
F = (Q + βB
> b PB)
−1(βB
> b PA + S
>).
A direct (if ineﬃcient) solution technique is to iterate on (29,30) simultaneously. We describe
another method shortly.
Robust control. As in our static example, the idea behind robust control is that a malevo-
lent nature chooses distortions w that reduce our utility. A recursive version has the Bellman
equation:
J(x) = max
v min
w
n
u(v,x) + β
￿
θw
>w + EJ(x
0)
￿o
subject to the law of motion x0 = Ax + Bv + C(w + ε0). The value function again takes the
form (25), so the Bellman equation can be expressed
−x
>Px − q = max
v min
w
n
−
￿
v
>Qv + x
>Rx + 2v
>Sx
￿
+ βθw
>w
−βE
￿
[Ax + Bv + C(w + ε
0)]
>P(Ax + Bv + Cε
0) + p
￿o
. (31)
The minimization leads to
w = (θI − C
>PC)
−1C
>P(Ax + Bv)
and
θw
>w − (Ax + Bv + Cw)
>P(Ax + Bv + Cw) = (Ax + Bv)
> b P(Ax + Bv),
where
b P = P + θ
−1PC(I − θ
−1C
>PC)
−1C
>P. (32)
30Comparing (32) with (29), we see that risk-sensitive and robust control lead to similar
objective functions and produce identical decision rules if θ−1 = 2α.
A diﬀerent representation of the problem leads to a solution that ﬁts exactly into the
traditional optimal control framework and is therefore amenable to traditional computational
methods. The min-max theorem suggests that we can compute the solutions for v and w
simultaneously. With this in mind, deﬁne
ˆ v =
"
vt
wt
#
, b Q =
"
Q 0
0 −βθI
#
, b S =
h
S 0
i
, b B =
h
B C
i
.
Then the problem is one of optimal control, and can be solved using the Riccati equation
(27) applied to ( b Q,R, b S,A, b B). The optimal controls are v = −F1x and w = −F2x, where
the Fi come from partitioning F. A doubling algorithm applied to this problem provides an
eﬃcient computational technique for robust and risk-sensitive control problems.
Entropy constraints. As in the static case, dynamic robust control problems can be
derived using an entropy constraint. Hansen and Sargent (2004, ch 6) suggest
∞ X
t=0
β
tw
>
t wt/2 ≤ I0.
Discounting is convenient here, but is not a direct outcome of a multiperiod entropy cal-
culation. They argue that discounting allows distortions to continue to play a role in the
solution; without it, the problem tends to drive It and wt to zero with time. A recursive
version of the constraint is
It+1 = β
−1(w
>
t wt − It).
A recursive robust constraint problem is based on an expanded state vector, (x,I), and
the law of motion for I above. As in the static case, the result is a theory of the Lagrange
multiplier θ. Conversely, the solution to a traditional robust control problem with given θ can
be used to compute the implied value of I0. The recursive version highlights an interesting
feature of this problem: nature not only minimizes at a point in time, but allocates entropy
over time in the way that has the greatest adverse impact on the agent.
Example 16 (robust precautionary saving). Consider a linear-quadratic version of the pre-
cautionary saving problem. A theoretical agent has quadratic utility, u(ct) = (ct − γ)2, and
maximizes the expected discounted sum of utility subject to a budget constraint and an
autoregressive income processs:
at+1 = r(at − ct) + yt+1
yt+1 = (1 − ϕ)¯ y + ϕyt + σεt+1,
where {εt} ∼ NID(0,1). We express this as a linear-quadratic control problem using ct as
31the control and (1,at,yt) as the state. The relevant matrices are
"
Q S>
S R
#
=

 


1 −γ 0 0
−γ γ2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 

,
A =



1 0 0
(1 − ϕ)¯ y r ϕ
(1 − ϕ)¯ y 0 ϕ


, B =



0
−r
0


, C =



0
σ
σ


.
We set β = 0.95, r = 1/β, γ = 2, ¯ y = 1, ϕ = 0.8, and σ = 0.25. For the optimal control
problem, the decision rule is
ct = 0.7917 + 0.0500at + 0.1583yt.
For the robust control problem with θ = 2 (or the risk-sensitive control problem with α =
1/2θ = 0.25), the decision rule is
ct = 0.7547 + 0.0515at + 0.1632yt.
The impact of robustness is to reduce the intercept (precautionary saving) and increase the
responsiveness to a and y. Why? The anticipated distortion is
wt = −0.1557 + 0.0064at + 0.0204yt,
making the actual and distorted dynamics
A =



1 0 0
0.2 1.0526 0.8
0.2 0 0.8


, A − CF2 =



1 0 0
−0.1247 1.0661 0.8425
−0.1247 0.0134 0.8425


.
The distorted dynamics are pessimistic (the income intercept changes from 0.2 to −0.1247)
and more persistent (the maximal eigenvalue increases from 1.0526 to 1.1086). The latter
calls for more aggressive responses to movements in a and y. [Adapted from Hansen, Sargent,
and Tallarini (1999) and Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002).]
Beyond LQG
You might conjecture (as we did) that the equivalence of risk-sensitive and robust control
hinges critically on the linear-quadratic-gaussian structure. It doesn’t. The critical func-
tional forms are the exponential certainty equivalent and the entropy constraint. With these
two ingredients, the objective functions of risk-sensitive and robust control are the same.
32We demonstrate the equivalence of risk-sensitive and robust control objective functions
in a ﬁnite-state setting where the math is relatively simple. Consider an environment with
conditional probabilities p(z0|z). Since z is immaterial in what follows, we ignore it from here
on. In a typical dynamic programming problem, the Bellman equation includes the term
EJ =
P
z0 p(z0)J(z0). A robust control problem has a similar term based on transformed
probabilities ˆ p(z0) whose values are limited by an entropy penalty:
b J = min
{ˆ p(z0)}
X
z0
ˆ p(z
0)J(z
0) + θ
(
X
z0
ˆ p(z
0)log[ˆ p(z
0)/p(z
0)]
)
+ λ
 
X
z0
ˆ p(z
0) − 1
!
.
If ˆ p(z0) = p(z0), this is simply EJ. The new elements are the minimization with respect to ˆ p
(the deﬁning feature of robust control), the entropy penalty on the choice of ˆ p (the standard
functional form), and the constraint that the transformed probabilities sum to one. For each
ˆ p(z0), the ﬁrst-order condition for the minimization is
J(z
0) + θ{log[ˆ p(z
0)/p(z
0)] + 1} + λ = 0. (33)
If we multiply by ˆ p(z0) and sum over z0, we get b J + θ + λ = 0, which we use to eliminate λ
below. Each ﬁrst-order condition implies
ˆ p(z
0) = p(z
0)e
−[J(z0)+θ+λ]/θ = p(z
0)e
−J(z0)/θ+b J/θ.
If we sum over z0 and take logs, we get
b J = −θlog
 
X
z0
p(z
0)exp[−J(z
0)/θ]
!
,
our old friend the exponential certainty equivalent with risk aversion parameter α = θ−1.
If we place b J in its Bellman equation context, we’ve shown that robust control is equiva-
lent (even outside the LQG class) to maximizing Kreps-Porteus utility with an exponential
certainty equivalent. The log in the entropy constraint of robust control reappears in the
exponential certainty equivalent. An open question is whether there’s a similar relationship
between Kreps-Porteus preferences with (say) a power certainty equivalent and a power-like
alternative to the entropy constraint.
Discussion: interpreting parameters
Risk-sensitive and robust control raise a number of estimation issues, some we’ve seen,
and some we haven’t. Risk-sensitive control is based on a special case of Kreps-Porteus
preferences and therefore leads to the same identiﬁcation issues we faced in the previous
section: we need variation over time in the conditional distribution of next period’s state to
distinguish time and risk parameters.
33Robust control raises new issues. Risk-sensitive and robust control lead to the same deci-
sion rules, so we might regard them as equivalent. But they’re based on diﬀerent preferences
and therefore lead to diﬀerent interpretations of parameters. While risk-sensitive control
suggests a risk averse agent, robust control suggests an agent who is uncertain about the
model that generated the data. In practice, the two can be quite diﬀerent. One diﬀerence
is plausibility: We may ﬁnd an agent with substantial model uncertainty (small θ) more
plausible than one with enormous risk aversion (large α). Similarly, if we ﬁnd that a model
estimated for Argentina suggests greater risk aversion than one estimated for the US, we
might prefer to attribute the diﬀerence to model uncertainty. Hansen and Sargent (2004,
ch 8) have developed a methodology for calibrating model uncertainty (“error detection
probabilities”) that gives the robust-control interpretation some depth. Another diﬀerence
crops up in comparisons across policy regimes: the two models can diﬀer substantially if we
consider policy experiments that change the amount of model uncertainty.
6 Ambiguity
In Sections 3 and 4, agents know the probabilities they face, and with enough regularity
and repetition an econometrician can estimate them. Here we consider preferences when the
consequences of our choices are uncertain or ambiguous. It’s not diﬃcult to think of such
situations: what are the odds that China revalues this year by more than 10%, that the eq-
uity premium is less than 3%, or that productivity shocks account for more than half of the
variance of US output growth? We might infer probabilities from history or market prices,
but it’s a stretch to say that we know (or can ﬁnd out) these probabilities, even though they
may aﬀect some of our decisions. One line of attack on this issue was suggested by Savage
(1954): that people maximize expected utility using “personal” or “subjective” probabilities.
In this case, we retain the analytical tractability of expected utility but lose the empirical
convenience of preferences based on the same probabilities that generate outcomes (rational
expectations). Another line of attack generalizes Savage: preferences are characterized by
multiple probability distributions or “priors.” We refer to such preferences as capturing am-
biguity and ambiguity aversion, and explore two examples: Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989)
“max-min” expected utility for static environments and Epstein and Schneider’s (2003) “re-
cursive multiple priors” extension to dynamic environments. The central issues are dynamic
consistency (something we need to address in dynamic settings) and identiﬁcation (how do
we distinguish agents with ambiguous preferences from those with expected utility?).
34Static ambiguity
Ambiguity has a long history and an equally long list of terminology. Diﬀerent varieties
have been referred to as Knightian uncertainty, Choquet expected utility, and expected
utility with non-additive (subjective) probabilities. Each of these terms refers to essentially
the same preferences. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provide a simple representation and
an axiomatic basis for a preference model in which an agent entertains multiple probability
models or priors. If the set of priors is Π, preferences are represented by the utility function
U({c(z)}) = min
π∈Π
X
z
π(z)u[c(z)] = min
π∈Π Eπu(c). (34)
Gilboa and Schmeidler refer to such preferences as “max-min” because agents maximize a
utility function that has been minimized with respect to the probabilities π. We denote
probabilities by π, rather than p, as a reminder that they are preference parameters. The
deﬁning feature is the set Π, which characterizes both ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. If
Π has a single element, (34) reduces to Savage’s subjective expected utility.
Gilboa and Schmeidler’s max-min preferences incorporate aversion to ambiguity: agents
dislike consequences with unknown odds. Consider an agent choosing among mutually ex-
clusive assets in a three-state world. State 1 is pure risk: it occurs with probability 1/3.
State 2 is ambiguous: it occurs with probability 1/3 − γ, with −1/6 ≤ γ ≤ 1/6. State 3 is
also ambiguous and occurs with probability 1/3 + γ. The agent’s probability distributions
over γ deﬁne the set Π. We use the distributions πγ(γ = g) = 1 for −1/6 ≤ g ≤ 1/6, which
imply (1/3,1/3 − g,1/3 + g) as elements of Π. These distributions over γ are dogmatic in
the sense that each places probability one on a particular value. The approach also allows
non-dogmatic priors, such as πγ(γ = −1/6) = πγ(γ = 1/6) = 1/2. In this setting, consider
the agent’s valuation of three assets: A pays one in state 1, nothing otherwise; B pays one in
state 2; and C pays one in state 3. How much is each asset worth on its own to a max-min
agent? To emphasize the diﬀerence between risk and ambiguity, let u(c) = c. Using (34),
we ﬁnd that asset A is worth 1/3 and assets B and C are each worth 1/6. The agent is
apparently averse to ambiguity in the sense that the ambiguous assets, B and C, are worth
less than the unambiguous asset, A. In contrast, an expected utility agent would never value
both B and C less than A.
Example 17 (portfolio choice and non-participation). We illustrate the impact of ambiguity
on behavior with an ambiguous version of Example 6. An agent has max-min preferences
with u(c) = cα/α and α = 0.5. She invests fraction w of initial wealth a0 in a risky asset
with returns (r(1) = κ1 − σ, r(2) = κ1 + σ, with σ = 0.17) and fraction 1 − w in a risk-free
asset with return r0 = 1.01 in both states. Previously we assumed the states were equally
likely: π(1) = π(2) = 1/2. Here we let π(1) take on any value in the interval [0.4,0.6] and
set π(2) = 1 − π(1). Two versions of this example illustrate diﬀerent features of max-min
preferences.
35• Version 1: First-order risk aversion generates a non-participation result. With expected
utility, agents are approximately neutral to fair bets. In a portfolio context, this means
they’ll buy a positive amount of an asset whose expected return is higher than the risk-
free rate, and sell it short if the expected return is lower. They choose w = 0 only if
the expected return is the same. With multiple priors, the agent chooses w = 0 for
a range of values of κ1 around the risk-free rate (the non-participation result). If we
buy, state 1 is the worst state and the min sets π(1) = 0.6. To buy a positive amount
of the risky asset, the ﬁrst-order condition must be increasing at w = 0:
0.6(r0)
α−1(κ1 − σ − r0) + 0.4(r0)
α−1(κ1 + σ − r0) ≥ 0,
which implies κ1−r0 ≥ 0.2σ or κ1 ≥ 1.01+0.2(0.17) = 1.044. If we sell, state 2 is worst
and the min sets π(2) = 0.6. The analogous ﬁrst-order condition must be decreasing:
0.4(r0)
α−1(κ1 − σ − r0) + 0.6(r0)
α−1(κ1 + σ − r0) ≤ 0,
which implies κ1 ≤ r0 − 0.2σ = 0.976. For 0.976 ≤ κ1 ≤ 1.044 the agent neither buys
nor sells.
• Version 2: Let κ1 = 1.07. Then the mean return is high enough to induce the agent
to buy the risky asset and state 1 is worst. The optimal portfolio is w = 2.147. In
this two-state example, the result is identical to disappointment aversion with δ = 0.5.
With more states, this need not be the case.
[Adapted from Dow and Werlang (1993) and Routledge and Zin (2001).]
Dynamic ambiguity
Epstein and Schneider (2003) extend max-min preferences to dynamic settings, providing an
axiomatic basis for
Ut = ut + β min
π∈Πt
EπUt+1, (35)
where Ut is short-hand for utility starting at some date-t history zt, ut is utility at zt, Ut+1
refers to utilities starting with histories zt+1 = (zt,zt+1) stemming from zt, Πt is a set of
one-period conditional probabilities π(zt+1|zt), and Eπ denotes the expectation computed
from the prior π. Hayashi (2003) generalizes (35) to non-linear time aggregators: Ut =
V (ut,minπ∈Πt EπUt+1).
As in Section 4, the combination of time and risk raises a question of dynamic consistency:
Can (35) be reconciled with some reasonable speciﬁcation of date-zero max-min preferences?
The answer is yes, but the argument is subtle. Consider the “dilation” example suggested
by Seidenfeld and Wasserman (1993). The starting point is the event tree in Figure 1, to
36which we add ambiguous probabilities. (We suggest you write them on the tree.) Date-
one probabilities are π(z1 = 1) = π(z1 = 2) = 1/2; they are not ambiguous. Date-two
(conditional) probabilities depend on z1 and an autocorrelation parameter ρ, for which the
agent has dogmatic priors on the values +1 and −1. Listed from top to bottom in the ﬁgure,
the conditional probabilities of the four date-two branches are π(z2 = 1|z1 = 1) = π(z2 =
2|z1 = 2) = (1 + ρ)/2 and π(z2 = 2|z1 = 1) = π(z2 = 1|z1 = 2) = (1 − ρ)/2. In words: the
probabilities depend on whether z1 and z2 are the same or diﬀerent and whether ρ is +1 or
−1.
With these probabilities, consider the value of an asset that pays one if z2 = 1, zero
otherwise. For convenience, let u(c) = c and set β = 1. If the recursive and date-zero
valuations of the asset diﬀer, preferences are dynamically inconsistent. Consider recursive
valuation. At node (A) in Figure 1, the value is (1 + ρ)/2. Minimizing with respect to ρ
as suggested by (35) implies ρ = −1 and a value of zero. Similarly, the value at node (B)
is also zero, this time based on ρ = 1. The value at date zero is therefore zero as well;
there is no ambiguity, so the value is (1/2)(0) + (1/2)(0) = 0. Now consider a (naive) date-
zero problem based on the two-period probabilities of the four possible two-period paths:
(1 + ρ)/4, (1 − ρ)/4, (1 − ρ)/4, and (1 + ρ)/4. Ambiguity in these probabilities is again
represented by ρ. Since the asset pays one if the ﬁrst or third path occurs, its date-zero
value is (1 + ρ)/4 + (1 − ρ)/4 = 1/2, which is not ambiguous. The date-zero value (1/2) is
clearly greater than the recursive value (0), so preferences are dynamically inconsistent. The
computational point: our recursive valuation allows ρ to diﬀer across date-one nodes, while
our date-zero valuation does not. The conceptual point: giving the agent access to date-one
information increases the amount of information but also increases the amount of ambiguity,
which reduces the value of the asset.
Any resolution of this dynamic inconsistency problem must modify either recursive or
date-zero preferences. Epstein and Schneider propose the latter. They show that if we expand
the set of date-zero probabilities in the right way, they lead to the same preferences as (35).
In general, preferences depend on probabilities over complete paths, which in our example
you might associate with the four terminal nodes in Figure 1. Epstein and Schneider’s
“rectangularity condition” tells us to compute the set of probabilities recursively, one period
at a time, starting at the end. At each step, we compute a set of probabilities for paths
given our current history. In our example, the main eﬀect of this approach is to eliminate
any connection between the values of ρ at the two date-one nodes. The resulting date-zero
probabilities take the form (1 + ρ1)/4, (1 − ρ1)/4, (1 − ρ2)/4, and (1 + ρ2)/4. The value
of the asset is therefore (1 + ρ1)/4 + (1 − ρ2)/4 = 1/2 + (ρ1 − ρ2)/4. If we minimize with
respect to both ρ1 and ρ2, we set ρ1 = −1 and ρ2 = +1 and the value is zero, the same
value we computed recursively. In short, expanding the date-zero set of probabilities in this
way reconciles date-zero and recursive valuations and resolves the dynamic inconsistency
problem.
37A related example illustrates the Epstein-Schneider approach in a somewhat more com-
plex environment that allows comparison to an alternative based on entropy constraints. The
setting remains the event tree in Figure 1. Date-one probabilities are π(z1 = 1) = (1 + δ)/2
and π(z1 = 2) = (1 − δ)/2, with a dogmatic prior for any δ in the interval [−¯ δ, ¯ δ] and
0 ≤ ¯ δ < 1. Date-two probabilities remain (1+ρ)/2, (1−ρ)/2, (1−ρ)/2, and (1+ρ)/2, but
we restrict ρ to the interval [−¯ ρ, ¯ ρ] for 0 ≤ ¯ ρ ≤ 1. An asset has date-two payoﬀs of (from top
to bottom in the tree) 1 + ε, ε, 1, and 0, where ε ≥ 0. The Seidenfeld-Wasserman example
is a special case with ¯ δ = ε = 0 and ¯ ρ = 1. The addition of ε to the payoﬀs introduces a
concern for ﬁrst-period ambiguity. Consider four approaches to the problem of valuing the
asset:
• Naive date-zero approach. The four branches have date-zero probabilities of [(1+δ)(1+
ρ)/4,(1 + δ)(1 − ρ)/4,(1 − δ)(1 − ρ)/4,(1 − δ)(1 + ρ)/4]. Conditional on δ and ρ, the
asset is worth (1 + ε + δ + δρ)/2. If we minimize with respect to both δ and ρ, the
value is (1 + ε + ¯ δε − ¯ δ¯ ρ)/2. If ¯ δ = ¯ ρ = 1/2 and ε = 1, the value is 9/8.
• Recursive approach. We work our way through the tree, starting at the end, applying
(35) as we go. At node (A), the value of the asset is (1 − ρ)/2. If we minimize with
respect to ρ, the value is minρ (1 + ρ)/2 + ε = (1 − ¯ ρ)/2 + ε (set ρ = −¯ ρ). At (B),
the value is minρ (1 − ρ)/2 = (1 − ¯ ρ)/2 (set ρ = ¯ ρ). At the initial node, the value is
(1− ¯ ρ)/2+(1+δ)ε/2. Minimizing with respect to δ gives us (1− ¯ ρ)/2+(1− ¯ δ)ε/2 =
[1 − ¯ ρ + (1 − ¯ δ)ε]/2 (set δ = −¯ δ). This is smaller than the date-zero valuation, which
implicitly forced us to choose the same value of ρ at (A) and (B). If ¯ δ = ¯ ρ = 1/2 and
ε = 1, the value is 1/2.
• Rectangular approach (“sophisticated date-zero”). As in the dilation example, we allow
ρ to diﬀer between the two date-one nodes, giving us two-period probabilities of [(1 +
δ)(1+ρ1)/4,(1+δ)(1−ρ1)/4,(1−δ)(1−ρ2)/4,(1−δ)(1+ρ2)/4]. Conditional on δ, ρ1,
and ρ2, the asset is worth (1+δ)(1+ρ1)(1+ε)/4+(1+δ)(1−ρ1)ε/4+(1−δ)(1−ρ2)/4.
Minimizing with respect to the parameters gives us the same value as the recursive
approach.
• Entropy approach. In this context, entropy is simply a way of describing the set Π: an
entropy constraint places limits on (δ,ρ1,ρ2) that correspond to limits on the condi-
tional probabilities at each node. We compute entropy at each node from equation (23)
using (1/2,1/2) as the reference probabilities. The date-one entropy of probabilities
following the initial node is
I1(δ) = (1/2)[(1 + δ)log(1 + δ) + (1 − δ)log(1 − δ)].
Note that I1(0) = 0, I1(δ) = I1(−δ) ≥ 0, and dI1/dδ = (1/2)log[(1 + δ)/(1 − δ)].
38Similarly, the date-two entropy for the node following z1 = i is
I2i(ρi) = (1/2)[(1 + ρi)log(1 + ρi) + (1 − ρi)log(1 − ρi)],
which has the same functional form as I1. The overall two-period entropy constraint
is
I1(δ) + [(1 + δ)/2]I21(ρ1) + [(1 − δ)/2]I22(ρ2) ≤ ¯ I (36)
for some number ¯ I > 0 (a preference parameter). Our problem is to chose (δ,ρ1,ρ2)
to minimize the value of the asset subject to the entropy constraint. What’s new is
the ability to shift ambiguity across periods implicit in the tradeoﬀ between ﬁrst- and
second-period entropy.
We solve this problem recursively. To do this, it’s helpful to break the constraint
into pieces: I1(δ) ≤ ¯ I1 and, for each i, I2i(ρi) ≤ ¯ I2 ≡ ¯ I − ¯ I1. they are equivalent to
the single entropy constraint (36) if the multipliers on the individual constraints are
equal. In the ﬁrst period, we choose not only the value of δ that satisﬁes the date-
one entropy constraint but how much entropy to use now (¯ I1) and how much to save
for the second period (¯ I2 = ¯ I − ¯ I1). The solution is the allocation of entropy that
equates the multipliers. Given a choice ¯ I1, we solve the date-two problems. At node A,
the entropy-constrained valuation problem is to choose ρ1 to minimize ε + (1 + ρ1)/2
subject to the entropy constraint I21(ρ1) ≤ ¯ I2. If θ is the multiplier on the constraint,
the ﬁrst-order condition is
1/2 + (θ/2)log[(1 + ρ1)/(1 − ρ1)] = 0.
As with rectangularity, we set ρ1 < 0 to reduce the probability of the good state
(z2 = 1). We’re going to reverse engineer this and determine the constraint associated
with setting ρ1 = −1/2, the number we used earlier. With this value, entropy is
¯ I2 = 0.1308 and the ﬁrst-order condition implies θ = 0.9102. The value of the asset at
this node is therefore ε + 1/4. At node B, if ¯ I2 = 0.1308 a similar calculation implies
ρ2 = 1/2, θ = 0.9102, and an asset value of 1/4. Note, in particular, that ρ is set
diﬀerently at the two nodes, just as it is under rectangularity. At the initial node, we
now have the problem of choosing δ to minimize [(1+δ)/2](ε+1/4)+[(1−δ)/2](1/4) =
1/4+[(1+δ)/2]ε subject to the entropy constraint I1(δ) ≤ ¯ I1. The ﬁrst-order condition
is
ε/2 + (θ/2)log[(1 + δ)/(1 − δ)] = 0.
If ε = 1 and ¯ I = 0.2616, the solution includes δ = 1/2, ¯ I1 = 0.1308, and θ = 0.9102.
As with rectangularity, the value is 1/2. However, for other values of ε entropy will
be reallocated between the two periods in the way that has the largest adverse impact
on utility. If 0 ≤ ε < 1, the risk between nodes (A) and (B) is relatively small and
entropy will be shifted from period one to period two, increasing |ρi| and decreasing
39|δ|. If ε > 1, ﬁrst-period risk is more important and entropy will be shifted from
period two to period one, with the opposite eﬀect. This reallocation of ambiguity has
no counterpart with rectangularity, where the range of probabilities (and associated
parameters) is unrelated to other aspects of the problem (the payoﬀs, for example,
represented here by ε).
We have, then, four approaches to the same problem, each of which has arguments in
its favor. The naive date-zero approach, which is in the spirit of Chamberlain’s (2000)
econometric application, allows less impact of ambiguity than the other approaches, but
does so in a way that remains consistent with a version of date-zero max-min preferences.
It does, however, place some importance on the choice of date zero: if we reoptimize in
the future, we would typically compute diﬀerent decisions. The recursive approach, without
rectangularity, might be justiﬁed as a game among agents at diﬀerent dates. The same idea
has been widely used in other contexts (the next section, for example). The rectangular
approach is a clever way to reconcile date-zero and recursive approaches and leads to a
natural recursive extension of Gilboa-Schmeidler. One puzzling consequence is that it can
induce ambiguity in events that have none to begin with. (Recall the joint probability of the
ﬁrst and third paths in the dilation example, which is 1/2 regardless of ρ.) The apparent
puzzle is resolved if we realize that the date-zero rectangular set does not represent date-
zero ambiguity, it represents the date-zero probabilities needed to anticipate preferences over
future ambiguity. Epstein and Schneider (2003, p 16) put it this way: “there is an important
conceptual distinction between the set of probability laws that the decision maker views as
possible ... and the set of priors that is part of the representation of preference.” Finally, the
entropy approach allows the “min” to operate not only within a period but across periods,
as entropy and ambiguity are allocated over time to have the greatest impact. This violates
conditional independence for reasons similar to habits (Example 13), but seems consistent
with the spirit of pessimism captured by the “min” in (34).
Example 18 (precautionary saving). Ambiguity generates precautionary saving through pes-
simism: pessimistic forecasts of future income reduce current consumption and raise current
saving. The magnitude depends on the degree of ambiguity. We illustrate the result with a
two-period example that shares several features with its robust control counterpart (Example
16). The endowment is y0 at date zero and y1 ∼ N(κ1 + γ,κ2) at date one. The parameter
γ governs ambiguity: γ2 ≤ g2 for some positive number g. An agent has utility function
U = u(c0) + β min
γ Eu(c1)
with u(c) = −exp(−αc). The budget constraint is c1 = y1 +r(y0 −c0). If we substitute this
into the objective function and compute the expectation, we ﬁnd
U = −exp(−αc0) − β min
γ exp[−αr(y0 − c0) − α(κ1 + γ) + α
2κ2/2].
40The minimization implies γ = −g (pessimism). The ﬁrst-order condition for c0 then implies
c0 = log(βr)/[α(r − 1)] + (ry0 + κ1)/(1 + r) − ακ2/[2(1 + r)] − g/(1 + r).
Here the second term is permanent income, the third is risk and risk aversion, and the fourth
the impact of ambiguity. [Adapted from Miao (2003).]
Example 19 (sharing ambiguity). If agents have identical homothetic preferences, optimal
allocations are proportional: the ratio of date-state consumption by one agent is proportional
to that of every other agent. In stationary settings, we often say (with some abuse of
the language) that consumptions are perfectly correlated. Observations of individuals and
countries, however, exhibit lower correlations, suggesting a risk-sharing puzzle. One line
attack on this puzzle is to let agents have diﬀerent preferences. In international economics,
for example, we might let the two countries consume diﬀerent goods. A variation on this
theme is to let preferences diﬀer in their degree of ambiguity. In particular, suppose agents
have less ambiguity over their own endowment than over other agents’ endowments. A
symmetric two-period, two-agent example shows how this might work. Agent i has utility
function
U
i = logc
i
0 + β min
πi∈Πi
X
z
π
i(z)logc
i
1(z),
for i = 1,2. In period zero, each is endowed with one unit of the common good. In period
one, there are four states (z) with the following endowments (yi) and probabilities (πi):
z y1 y2 π1 π2 c1 c2
1 2 2 1/4 − γ1 1/4 − γ2 2 2
2 2 1 1/4 + γ1 1/4 − γ2 9/4 3/4
3 1 2 1/4 − γ1 1/4 + γ2 3/4 9/4
4 1 1 1/4 + γ1 1/4 + γ2 1 1
Each set Πi is constructed from dogmatic priors over values for γi between −1/8 and 1/8.
Note that each agent is ambiguous about the other agent’s endowment, but not her own.
Without ambiguity (γi = 0), the symmetric optimal allocation consists of one-half the aggre-
gate endowment in all states: perfect correlation across the date-one states. With ambiguity,
agent i chooses the value of γi that minimizes her utility, γi = 1/8. Since agent 1 applies
a lower probability (1/8) to state 3 than agent 2 (3/8), she gets a proportionally smaller
share of the aggregate endowment in that state. The resulting allocations are listed in the
table and show imperfect correlation across agents. The amount of ambiguity in this case
is so large that in states 2 and 3 the agent with the larger endowment consumes even more
than her endowment. A simple decentralization makes the same point. Suppose agents at
date zero trade claims to the endowments of the two countries. How much would each invest
in her own endowment, and how much in the other agent’s endowment? If w is agent 1’s
investment in her own endowment, it satisﬁes
wy
1(z) + (1 − w)y
2(z) = c
1(z)
41for all states z. The solution in this case is w = 5/4: agent 1 exhibits extreme home bias in
her portfolio. [Adapted from Alonso (2004) and Epstein (2001).]
Discussion: detecting ambiguity
Preferences based on subjective probabilities capture interesting features of behavior that
other preferences cannot, but they raise challenging issues for quantitative applications.
Consider subjective expected utility. If we allow the probabilities that enter preferences
(π) to diﬀer from those that generate the data (p), we can “explain” many things that are
otherwise puzzling. The equity premium, for example, could result from agents placing lower
probability on high-return states than the data generating process. It is precisely the lack
of predictive content in such explanations that led us to rational expectations (π = p) in
Sections 3 and 4.
Ambiguity provides a justiﬁcation for systematically pessimistic probabilities — they’re
the minimizing choice from a larger set — but raises two new issues. One is how to specify
the larger set of probabilities or models. Hansen and Sargent (2004) propose choosing models
that have have similar log-likelihood functions, much as we do in hypothesis tests. Diﬀerences
between such models are presumably diﬃcult to detect in ﬁnite data sets. Epstein and
Schneider (2004) suggest nonstationary ambiguous models that are indistinguishable from a
reference model, even in inﬁnite samples. The other issue is observational equivalence: robust
control and recursive multiple priors generate behavior that could have been generated by
an expected utility agent, and possibly by a Kreps-Porteus agent as well. In some cases, the
agent seems implausible, but in others not. Distinguishing between ambiguous and expected
utility agents remains an active area of current research. The most ambitious example to date
is Epstein and Schneider (2004), who note that ambiguous news has an unusual asymmetric
aﬀect on asset prices, since bad news aﬀects the minimizing probability distribution but good
news does not.
7 Inconsistency and temptation
Economists often tell stories about the hazards of temptation and the beneﬁts of reducing our
choice sets to avoid it. We eat too much junk food, we over-consume addictive substances,
and we save too little. To counter these tendencies, we may put ourselves in situations
where the range of choices limits our ability to make bad decisions. We go to restaurants
that serve only healthy food, support laws that discourage or prohibit addictive substances,
and sequester our wealth in housing and 401(k) accounts that are less easily used to ﬁnance
current consumption. The outstanding questions are why we make such choices, what the
relevant welfare criterion should be, and how we might detect the impact of temptation on
42observed decisions.
Inconsistent preferences
The traditional approach was outlined in Example 4: dynamically inconsistent preferences.
This line of research is motivated by experimental studies, which suggest that subjects
discount the immediate future more rapidly than the distant future. Common practice is to
approximate this pattern of discounting with the “quasi-geometric” or “quasi-hyperbolic”
scheme: 1,δβ,δβ2,δβ3, and so on, with 0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1. The critical parameter is
δ: if δ < 1, the discount factor between dates t = 0 and t = 1 (namely, δβ) is less than the
discount factor between dates t = 1 and t = 2 (β).
Let us say, then, that an agent’s utility from date t on is
Ut = Et
h
u(ct) + δβu(ct+1) + δβ
2u(ct+2) + δβ
3u(ct+3) + ···
i
= u(ct) + δβEt
∞ X
j=0
β
ju(ct+j+1).
The only diﬀerence from Example 4 is the introduction of uncertainty implicit in the con-
ditional expectation Et. The dynamic inconsistency of these preferences suggests two ques-
tions: With competing preferences across dates, what does such an agent do? And what
preferences should we use for welfare analysis? We need an answer to the ﬁrst question to
derive the behavioral implications of inconsistent preferences, and an answer to the second
to evaluate the beneﬁts of policies that limit choice.
The consensus answer to the ﬁrst question has become: treat the problem as a game
with the agent at each date acting as a separate player. Each such player makes choices
that maximize her utility, given the actions of other players (herself at other dates). There
are many games like this, corresponding to diﬀerent strategy spaces. We look at stationary
Markov perfect equilibria, in which agents’ decisions are stationary functions of the current
state for some natural deﬁnition of the state. Consider the classical consumption problem
with budget constraint at+1 = rt+1(at − ct) + yt+1, where y and r are iid positive random
variables, and a borrowing constraint a ≥ a that we will ignore. Our objective is a stationary
decision rule ct = h(at) that solves the game. With constant discounting (δ = 1), the problem
is the solution to the dynamic programming problem summarized by the Bellman equation,
J(a) = max
c u(c) + βEJ[r
0(a − c) + y
0].
Under standard conditions, J exists, and is unique, continuous, concave, and diﬀerentiable.
Given such a J, the maximization leads to a continuous stationary decision rule c = h(a).
The equilibrium of a game can be qualitatively diﬀerent. A stationary decision rule can
43be derived with a “future value function,”
J(a) = u(c
∗) + βEJ[r
0(a − c
∗) + y
0], (37)
where
c
∗ = argmax
c u(c) + δβEJ[r
0(a − c) + y
0]. (38)
Note the diﬀerence: when δ < 1, the relation that generates J is diﬀerent from that gener-
ating the choice of c. As a result, the decision rule need not be unique or continuous; see
Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell and Smith (2004), and Morris and Postlewaite (1997).
For all of these reasons, there can be no general observational equivalence result between
constant and quasi-geometric discounting. Nevertheless, the solutions are similar in some
common examples.
Example 20 (consumption and saving). Consider the classical saving problem with log utility
(u(c) = logc), budget constraint at+1 = rt+1(at − ct) (no labor income), and log-normal re-
turn ({logrt} ∼ NID(µ,σ2)). With quasi-geometric discounting, we compute the stationary
decision rule from
J(a) = logc
∗ + βEJ[r
0(a − c
∗)]
c
∗ = argmax
c logc + δβEJ[r
0(a − c)].
We ﬁnd the solution by guessing that the value function has the form J(a) = A + B loga.
The ﬁrst-order condition from the maximization implies c = (1+δβB)−1a. Substituting into
the recursion for J, we ﬁnd B = (1 − β)−1 and
c =
 
1 − β
1 − β + δβ
!
a = h(a).
Compare this decision rule with two others:
• Constant discounting. The decision rule with constant discounting is c = (1−β)a (set
δ = 1). Note that with quasi-geometric discounting the agent consumes more, but not
as much more as an agent with constant discount factor βδ. The latter is the result of
strategic interactions between agents. The data-t agent would like to save a fraction
δβ of her assets at date t, and a larger fraction β at future dates t+n > t. She knows,
however, that future agents will make the same calculation and choose saving rates
less than β. To induce future agents to consume more (absolutely, not as a fraction of
wealth), she saves more than δβ today. Note, too, that her consumption behavior is
observationally equivalent to an agent with constant discount factor
ˆ β =
δβ
1 − β + δβ
< β.
44A similar result holds for power utility, and suggests that despite the diﬃculties noted
earlier, constant and quasi-geometric discounting may be diﬃcult to distinguish in
practice.
• Commitment. Suppose the date-t agent can choose decision rules for future agents.
Since the agent’s discount factor between any future dates t+n > t and t+n+1 is β,
she chooses the decision rules ct = (1 − δβ)at for date t and ct+n = (1 − β)at+n for all
future dates t + n > t. This allocation maximizes the utility of the date-t agent, so in
that sense “commitment” (limiting our future choice sets) is good. But it’s not clear
that date-t preferences are the appropriate welfare criterion.
[Adapted from Barro (1999), ˙ Imroho˘ glu, ˙ Imroho˘ glu, and Joines (2003), and Phelps and
Pollack (1968).]
Example 21 (asset pricing). A similar example can be used to illustrate the role of quasi-
geometric discounting on asset prices. The ﬁrst step is to derive the appropriate Euler
equation for (37,38). Deﬁne the “current value function” by
L(a) = max
c u(c) + δβEJ[r
0(a − c) + y
0]. (39)
The ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions are
u1(c) = δβE[J1(a
0)r
0]
L1(a) = δβE[J1(a
0)r
0],
implying the familiar L1(a) = u1(c). In the constant discounting case, J(a) = L(a) and
we’re almost done. With quasi-geometric discounting, we need another method to express
J1 in terms of u1. Note that we if we multiply (37) by δ and subtract from (39) we can relate
J to L and u: δJ(a) = L(a) − (1 − δ)u(c). Diﬀerentiating yields
δJ1(a) = L1(a) − (1 − δ)u1(c)h1(a).
If we multiply by β and substitute into the ﬁrst-order condition, we get the Euler equation,
u(ct) = Et {β[1 − (1 − δ)h1(at+1)]u1(ct+1)rt+1}.
This relation is a curious object: it depends not only on the current agent’s decision problem,
but (through h) on the strategic interactions among agents. The primary result is to decrease
the eﬀective discount factor, and raise mean asset returns, relative to the standard model.
[Adapted from Harris and Laibson (2003), Krusell, Kuru¸ s¸ cu, and Smith (2002), and Luttmer
and Mariotti (2003).]
45Temptation
Many of us have been in situations in which we felt we had “too many choices.” (Zabar’s
Delicatessen and Beer World have that eﬀect on us.) In traditional decision theory this
statement is nonsense: extra choices are at best neutral, because you can always decide not
to use them. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) give the phrase meaning: they develop preferences
in which adding inferior choices (“temptations”) can leave you worse oﬀ. Among its features:
utility can depend on the set of choices, as well as the action taken; temptation (in the sense
of inferior choices) can reduce utility; and commitment (in the sense of restricting the choice
set) can increase utility. We describe their theory in a static setting, then go on to explore
dynamic extensions, including some that resemble quasi-geometric discounting.
Let us compare two sets of choices, A and B. In traditional decision theory, the utility of
a set of possible choices is the utility of its best element. If the best element of A is at least
as good as the best element of B, then we would say A is weakly preferred to B: A ￿ B
in standard notation. Suppose we allow choice over the potentially larger set A ∪ B. The
traditional approach would tell us that this cannot have an impact on our decision or utility:
if A ￿ B, then we are indiﬀerent between A and A ∪ B. Gul and Pesendorfer suggest a set
betweenness condition that allows inferior choices to aﬀect our preference ordering:
A ￿ B implies A ￿ A ∪ B ￿ B.
The traditional answer is one extreme (namely, A ∼ A∪B), but set betweenness also allows
inferior choices B to reduce our utility (A ￿ A ∪ B). We say in such cases that B is a
temptation.
Adding set betweenness to an otherwise traditional theory, Gul and Pesendorfer show
that preferences can be represented by a utility function of the form:
u(A) = max
c∈A [v(c) + w(c)] − max
c∈A w(c). (40)
Note that preferences are deﬁned for the choice set A; we have abandoned the traditional
separation between preferences and opportunities. To see how this works, compare the
choices c∗ = argmaxc∈A [v(c) + w(c)] and c∗∗ = argmaxc∈A w(c) for some choice set A. If
c∗ = c∗∗, then v and w agree on A and preferences are eﬀectively governed by v (the w terms
cancel). If not, then w acts as a temptation function.
Example 22 (consumption and saving). A clever use of temptations reproduces quasi-
geometric discounting. Let
v(c1,c2) = u(c1) + βu(c2)
w(c1,c2) = γ [u(c1) + δβu(c2)],
46with 0 < δ < 1 and γ ≥ 0 (intensity of temptation). The budget constraint has two parts:
c1 + k2 = rk1 and c2 = rk2, with k1 given, which deﬁnes A. The agent solves
max
c1,c2∈A[(1 + γ)u(c1) + (1 + γδ)βu(c2)] − max
c1,c2∈Aγ [u(c1) + δβu(c2)].
The ﬁrst max delivers the ﬁrst-order condition
1 =
 
1 + γδ
1 + γ
!
β
u1(c2)
u1(c1)
r.
The diﬀerence from the standard model lies in the ﬁrst term. The two extremes are γ = 0
(which gives us the standard no-temptation model) and γ = ∞ (which gives us an irresistible
temptation and the quasi-geometric discount factor δβ). Since the term is decreasing in γ,
greater temptation raises ﬁrst-period consumption. [Adapted from Krusell, Kuru¸ s¸ cu, and
Smith (2003).]
Gul and Pesendorfer (2002, 2004) and Krusell, Kuru¸ s¸ cu, and Smith (2003) have ex-
tended the temptation approach to quasi-geometric discounting to inﬁnite-horizon settings.
We illustrate the idea with a non-stochastic version of the consumption problem. Krusell,
Kuru¸ s¸ cu, and Smith suggest an approach summarized by the “Bellman equation”
J(a) = max
c {u(c) + βJ[r(a − c)] + L[r(a − c)]} − max
c L[r(a − c)],
where
L(a) = γ {u(c
∗) + δβL[r(a − c
∗)]}
serves as a temptation function and c∗ = argmaxc u(c)+βJ[r(a−c)]+L[r(a−c)]. Gul and
Pesendorfer suggest the special case δ = 0. The Krusell-Kuru¸ s¸ cu-Smith version reproduces
the ﬁrst-order conditions and decision rules generated by the Markov perfect equilibrium for
quasi-geometic discounting. The Gul-Pesendorfer version avoids some of the mathematical
oddities associated with the former. Each suggests an answer to the welfare question.
Discussion: detecting inconsistency and temptation
The diﬃculty of estimating the parameters of models based on quasi-geometric discount-
ing is that the decision rules often look like those from traditional models with constant
discounting. In some cases, they’re identical. One way to distinguish between them is to
look for evidence of commitment. Agents with inconsistent preferences or temptations will
typically be willing to pay something to restrict their future choice sets. In models with
constant discounting there is no such incentive, so commitment devices provide a natural
way to tell the two approaches apart. Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998, 2004) apply
this logic and ﬁnd that the combination of illiquid asset positions (pensions, 401(k) accounts)
and high-interest liabilities (credit card debt) generates sharp diﬀerences between the two
47models and precise estimates of the discount parameters (δ = 0.70, β = 0.96, annual). With
constant discounting, borrowing at high rates and investing at (on average) lower rates are
incompatible.
The focus on commitment devices seems right to us, both for quasi-geometric discounting
and for temptations more generally. There are, however, some outstanding questions, most
of them noted by Kocherlakota (2001). One is whether tax-sheltered savings have other
explanations (lower taxes, for example). If 401(k)’s were a pure commitment device, we
might expect people to pay more for them and receive less, but this doesn’t seem to be
the case: sheltered and unsheltered investment vehicles have pretty much the same returns.
Similarly, if commitment is valuable, why would an agent hold both liquid (uncommitted)
and illiquid (committed) assets? The former would seem to undercut the bite of the latter.
Finally, what is the likely market response to the conﬂicting demands of commitment and
temptation? Will the market supply commitment devices or ways to avoid them? Is credit
card debt designed to satisfy agents’ desire to undo past commitments? Does it lower welfare?
Perhaps future work will resolve these questions.
8 Questions, answers, and ﬁnal thoughts
We have described a wide range of exotic preferences and applied them to a number of classic
macroeconomic problems. Are there any general lessons we might draw from this eﬀort? We
organize a discussion around speciﬁc questions.
Why model preferences rather than behavior?
Preferences play two critical roles in economic models. The ﬁrst is that they provide, in
principle, an unchanging feature of a model in which agents can be confronted with a wide
range of diﬀerent environments, institutions, or policies. For each environment, we derive
behavior (decision rules) from the same preferences. If we modelled behavior directly, we
would also have to model how it adjusted to changing circumstances. The second role of
preferences is to evaluate the welfare eﬀects of changing policies or circumstances. Without
preferences, it’s not clear how we how we should distinguish good policies from bad. In our
view, this is a major accomplishment of the “temptation” interpretation of quasi-geometric
discounting: it suggests a clear welfare criterion.
48Are exotic preferences simply an excuse for free parameters?
Theoretical economists think nothing of modifying the environments faced by their agents.
Aggregate and individual risk, length of life, information structures, enforcement technolo-
gies, and productivity shocks are all fair game. However, many economists seem to believe
that modifying preferences is cheating — that we will be able to explain anything (and
hence nothing) if we allow ourselves enough freedom over preferences. We would argue in-
stead that we have restricted ourselves to an extremely limited model of preferences for no
better reasons than habit and convenience. Many of the weaknesses of expected utility, for
example, have been obvious since the 1950s. We now have the tools to move beyond additive
preferences in several directions, why not use them?
Equally important, the axiomatic foundations that underlie the preferences described
above impose a great deal of discipline on their structure. We have let these foundations
go largely without mention, but they nevertheless restrict the kinds of ﬂexibility we’ve con-
sidered. Chew-Dekel risk preferences, for example, are more ﬂexible than expected utility,
but far less ﬂexible than general preferences over state-contingent claims. One consequence:
exotic preferences have led to some progress on the many empirical puzzles that plague
macroeconomics and ﬁnance, but they have yet to resolve them.
Some exotic preferences make greater — or at least novel — demands on the data than
we are used to. Kreps-Porteus and Epstein-Zin preferences, for example, require time-
dependence of risk to identify separate time and risk preference parameters. Robust control
comes with an entropy toolkit for setting plausible values of the robustness parameter, but
comparisons across environments may be needed to distinguish robust from risk-sensitive
control. Applications of temptation preferences to problems with quasi-geometric discount-
ing rely heavily (entirely?) on observed implications of commitment devices, about which
there is some diﬀerence of opinion. In short, exotic preferences raise new empirical issues
that deserve open and honest debate. We see no reason, however, to rule out departures
from additive utility before we start.
Are exotic preferences “behavioral”?
Many of the preferences we’ve described were motivated by discrepancies between observed
behavior and the predictions of the additive preference model. In that sense, they have a
“behaviorial” basis. They are also well-deﬁned neoclassical preference orderings. For that
reason, we think our approach falls more naturally into neoclassical economics than into the
behavioral sciences.
We regard this as both a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, the strong theoret-
ical foundations for exotic preferences allow us to use all the tools of neoclassical economics,
49particularly optimization and welfare analysis. On the other hand, these tools ignore aspects
of human behavior stressed in other social sciences, particularly sociology and social psy-
chology. Kreps (2000) and (especially) Simon (1959) are among the many economists who
have argued that something of this sort is needed to account for some aspects of behavior.
We have some sympathy for this argument, but it’s not what we’ve done in this paper.
Are there interesting preferences we’ve missed?
If you’ve gotten this far, you may feel that we can’t possibly have left anything out. But it’s
not true. We barely scratched the surface of robust control, ambiguity, hyperbolic discount-
ing, and temptation. If you’d like to know more, you might start with the papers listed in
Appendix A. We also ignored some lines of work altogether. Among them are:
• Incomplete preferences. Some of the leading decision theorists suggest that the most
troubling axiom underlying expected utility is not the infamous “independence axiom”
but the more common assumption of completeness: that all possible choices can be
compared. Schmeidler (1989), for example, argues that the critical role of the inde-
pendence axiom is to extend preferences from choices that seem obvious to those that
do not — that it delivers completeness. For this and other reasons, there is a long
history of work on incomplete preferences. Notable applications in macroeconomics
and ﬁnance include Bewley (1986) and Kraus and Sagi (2002, 2004).
• Flexibility, commitment, and self-control. Kreps (1979) describes environments in
which agents prefer to maintain ﬂexibility over future choices, just as agents with
temptations prefer commitment. Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2003) characterize
optimal allocation rules when you put the two together. Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy,
and Tyler (2004) quantify self-control with survey evidence and relate it to individual
ﬁnancial decisions. Benhabib and Bisin (2004) take a cognitive approach to a similar
problem in which agents choose between automatic processes, which are subject to
temptations, and control processes, which are not.
• Social utility. Experimental research suggests that preferences often depend on com-
parisons with others; see, for example, Blount (1995) and Rabin (1998). Abel (1990)
and Gal´ ı (1994) are well-known applications to asset pricing.
• Other psychological approaches. B´ enabou and Tirole (2002) model self-conﬁdence.
Bernheim and Rangel (2002) build a cognitive model and apply it to addiction. Brun-
nermeier and Parker (2003) propose a model of subjective beliefs in which agents bal-
ance the utility beneﬁts of optimism and the utility cost of inferior decisions. Caplin
and Leahy (2002) introduce anxiety into an otherwise standard dynamic choice frame-
work and explore its implications for portfolio choice and the equity premium.
50We ﬁnd all of this work interesting, but leave a serious assessment of it to others.
Have we wasted your time (and ours)?
It’s too late, of course, but you might ask yourself whether this has been worth the eﬀort.
To paraphrase Monty Python, “Have we deliberately wasted your time?” We hope not. We
would guess that additive preferences will continue to be the industry standard in macroeco-
nomics, ﬁnance, and other ﬁelds. Their tight structure leads to strong and clear predictions,
which is generally a virtue. But we would also guess that exotic preferences will become more
common, particularly in quantitative work. Who knows, they may even lose their claim to
being “exotic.”
We think several varieties of exotic preferences have already proved themselves. Appli-
cations of Kreps-Porteus and Epstein-Zin preferences to asset pricing, precautionary saving,
and risk-sharing are good examples. While these preferences have not solved all of our prob-
lems, they have become a frequent source of insight. Their ease of use in econometric work
is another mark in their favor.
The preferences described in the last three sections are closer to the current frontiers of
research, but we are optimistic that they, too, will lead to deeper understanding of economic
behavior. Certainly robust control, recursive multiple priors, and temptation are signiﬁ-
cant additions to our repertoire. They also raise new questions about identiﬁcation and
estimation. Multiple priors is a good example. When the probabilities aﬀecting an agent’s
preferences are not characterized simply by the probabilities generating the data, we need to
parameterize the agent’s uncertainty and describe how it evolves through time. We also need
to explore ways to distinguish such agents from those with expected utility or Kreps-Porteus
preferences. Temptation is another. As a profession, we need to clarify the features of data
that identify the parameters of temptation functions, as well as the kinds of temptations that
are most useful in applied work. None of these tasks are simple, but we think the progress
of the last decade gives us reason to hope for more.
Let’s get to work!
51A Reader’s guide
We have intentionally favored application over theory, but if you’d like to know more about
the theoretical underpinnings of exotic preferences, we recommend the following:
Section 2. Koopmans (1960) is the classic reference. Koopmans (1986) lays out the
relevant theory of independent preferences. Lucas and Stokey (1984) approach the problem
from what now seems like a more natural direction: they start with an aggregator function,
while Koopmans derives one. Epstein and Hynes (1983) propose a convenient functional
form and work through an extensive set of examples.
Section 3. Kreps (1988) is far and away the best reference we’ve seen for the theory
underlying the various approaches to expected utility. Starmer (2000) gives a less technical
overview of the theory and discusses both empirical anomalies and modiﬁcations of the
theory designed to deal with them. Brandenburger (2002) describes some quite diﬀerent
approaches to probability assessments that have been used in game theory.
Section 4. Our two favorite theory references on dynamic choice in risky environments are
Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Johnsen and Donaldson (1985). Epstein and Zin (1989) de-
scribe the technical issues involved in specifying stationary recursive preferences and explain
the roles of the parameters of the constant elasticity version.
Section 5. Our primary reference is Hansen and Sargent’s (2004) monograph on robust
control; we recommend chapters 2 (overview), 5 (static robust control), 6 (dynamic robust
control), and 9 and 17 (entropy constraints). Whittle (1990) is an introduction to linear-
quadratic robust control for engineers. Hansen and Sargent (1997) introduce risk-sensitive
control in chapters 9 and 15. Gianonni (2002), Maenhout (2004), Onatski and Williams
(2003), and Van Nieuwerburgh (2001) are interesting applications.
Section 6. The essential references are Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and
Schneider (2003). Among the other papers we have found useful are Ahn (2003), Casadesus-
Masanell, Klibanoﬀ, and Ozdenoren (2000), Chamberlain (2000), Epstein and Schneider
(2002, 2004), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993), Hayashi (2003), Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Muk-
erji (2003), Sagi (2003), Schmeidler (1989), and Wang (2003).
Section 7. The relevant theory is summarized in Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), Harris and
Laibson (2003), and Krusell, Kuru¸ s¸ cu, and Smith (2004). DeJong and Ripoll (2003), Este-
ban, Miyagawa, and Shum (2004), and Krusell, Kuru¸ s¸ cu, and Smith (2002) are interesting
applications.
B Integral formulas
A number of our examples lead to normal-exponential integrals, most commonly as expecta-
tions of log-normal random variables or exponential certainty equivalents of normal random
variables. The following deﬁnitions and formulas are used in the paper.
52Standard normal density and distribution functions. If x ∼ N(0,1), its density is f(x) =
(2π)−1/2e−x2/2. Note that f is symmetric: f(x) = f(−x). The distribution function is
Φ(x) ≡
R x
−∞ f(u)du. By symmetry,
R ∞
x f(u)du = 1 − Φ(x) = Φ(−x).
Integrals of “ea+bxf(x).” We come across integrals of this form in Section 3, when we
compute certainty equivalents for log-normal risks, and Section 4, when we consider the
exponential certainty equivalent of a linear value function (Weil’s model of precautionary
saving). Their evaluation follows from a change of variables. Consider the integral
Z x∗
−∞
e
a+bxf(x)dx = (2π)
−1/2
Z x∗
−∞
e
a+bx−x2/2dx.
We solve this by completing the square: expressing the exponent as a+bx−x2/2 = d−y2/2,
where d is a scalar and y = fx−g is a linear transformation of x. We ﬁnd y = x−b (f = 1,
g = b) and d = a + b2/2, so the integral is
(2π)
−1/2
Z x∗
−∞
e
a+bx−x2/2dx = e
a+b2/2
Z x∗−b
−∞
f(y)dy = e
a+b2/2 Φ(x
∗ − b). (41)
A common special case has an inﬁnite upper limit of integration:
E(e
a+bx) = (2π)
−1/2
Z ∞
−∞
e
a+bx−x2/2dx = e
a+b2/2. (42)
Example: Let logy = µ + σx; then Ey = E(elogy) = E(eµ+σx) = eµ+σ2/2.
Integrals of “ea+bx+cx2f(x).” Integrals like this arise in Section 5 in risk-sensitive control
with a quadratic objective. Consider
Z ∞
−∞
e
a+bx+cx2
f(x)dx = (2π)
−1/2
Z ∞
−∞
e
a+bx−(1−2c)x2/2dx.
We assume 1−2c > 0; otherwise the integral diverges. We solve by the same method: express
the exponent as a+bx−(1−2c)x2/2 = d−y2/2 for some y = fx−g. We ﬁnd f = (1−2c)1/2,
g = b/(1 − 2c)1/2, and d = a + b2/(1 − 2c), so that y = (1 − 2c)1/2x − b/(1 − 2c)1/2. The
integral becomes
Z ∞
−∞
e
a+bx+cx2
f(x)dx = (1 − 2c)
−1/2e
a+b2/[2(1−2c)]
Z ∞
−∞
f(y)dy
= (1 − 2c)
−1/2e
a+b2/[2(1−2c)]. (43)
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This event tree illustrates how uncertainty might evolve through time. Time moves from
left to right, starting at date t = 0. At each date t, an event zt occurs. In this example, zt
is drawn from the two-element set Z = {1,2}. Each node is marked by a box and can be
identiﬁed from the path of events that leads to it, which we refer to as a history and denote
by zt ≡ (z0,...,zt), starting with an arbitrary initial node z0. Thus the upper right node
follows two up branches, z1 = 1 and z2 = 1, and is denoted z2 = (z0,1,1). The set Z2 of all
possible 2-period histories is therefore {(z0,1,1),(z0,1,2),(z0,2,1),(z0,2,2)}, illustrated by
the far right “column” of nodes.
60Figure 2
State-space indiﬀerence curves with Chew-Dekel preferences
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All Together
The ﬁgure contains indiﬀerence curves for three members of the Chew-Dekel class of risk
preferences. In each case, the axes are consumption in state 1 and state 2 and states are
equally likely. The risk preferences are expected utility (upper left, α = 0.5), weighted
utility (upper right, bold line, γ = −0.25), and disappointment aversion (lower left, bold
line, δ = 0.5). For weighted utility and disappointment aversion, expected utility is pictured
with a lighter line for comparison. For disappointment aversion, the indiﬀerence curve is
the upper envelope of two indiﬀerence curves, each based on a diﬀerent set of transformed
probabilities. The extensions of these two curves are shown as dashed lines. The lower right
ﬁgure has all three together: expected utility (dashed line), weighted utility (solid line),
and disappointment aversion (dash-dotted line). Note that disappointment aversion is more
sharply convex than weighted utility near the 45-degree line (the eﬀect of ﬁrst-order risk
aversion), but less convex far away from it.
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Risk and risk premiums with Chew-Dekel preferences
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Variance of Log Consumption
R
i
s
k
 
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
Expected Utility
Disappointment Aversion
Weighted Utility
The ﬁgure illustrates the relation between risk and risk premiums discussed in Example 5 for
three members of the Chew-Dekel class of risk preferences. The preferences are: expected
utility (dashed line), weighted utility (solid line), and disappointment aversion (dash-dotted
line). The point is the nonlinearity of disappointment aversion: the ratio of the risk premium
to risk is greater for small risks than large ones. Parameter values are the same as Figure 2.
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Transformed probabilities: Entropy and disappointment aversion
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The ﬁgure illustrates two sets of transformed probabilities described in Example 15: one
set generated by an entropy constraint and the other by disappointment aversion. The
bold triangle is the three-state probability simplex. The “+” in the middle represents the
reference probabilities: p(1) = p(2) = p(3) = 1/3. The area inside the egg-shaped contour
represents transformed probabilities with entropy less than 0.1. The dashed line represents
probabilities implied by disappointment aversion with δ between 0 to 1.5.
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